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Abstract
Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle (PPP) is an important subclass of TFNP with profound
connections to the complexity of the fundamental cryptographic primitives: collision-resistant
hash functions and one-way permutations. In contrast to most of the other subclasses of TFNP,
no complete problem is known for PPP. Our work identifies the first PPP-complete problem
without any circuit or Turing Machine given explicitly in the input: constrained-SIS, and thus
we answer a longstanding open question from [Pap94].
constrained-SIS: a generalized version of the well-known Short Integer Solution
problem (SIS) from lattice-based cryptography.
In order to give some intuition behind our reduction for constrained-SIS, we identify another
PPP-complete problem with a circuit in the input but closely related to lattice problems:
BLICHFELDT.
BLICHFELDT: the computational problem associated with Blichfeldt’s fundamental
theorem in the theory of lattices.
Building on the inherent connection of PPP with collision-resistant hash functions, we use
our completeness result to construct the first natural hash function family that captures the
hardness of all collision-resistant hash functions in a worst-case sense, i.e. it is natural and
universal in the worst-case. The close resemblance of our hash function family with SIS, leads
us to the first candidate collision-resistant hash function that is both natural and universal in
an average-case sense.
Finally, our results enrich our understanding of the connections between PPP, lattice prob-
lems and other concrete cryptographic assumptions, such as the discrete logarithm problem
over general groups.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental task of Computational Complexity theory is to classify computational problems
according to their inherent computational difficulty. This led to the definition of complexity classes
such as NP which contains the decision problems with efficiently verifiable proofs in the “yes”
instances. The search analog of the class NP, called FNP, is defined as the class of search problems
whose decision version is in NP. The same definition extends to the class FP, as the search analog
of P. The seminal works of [JPY88, Pap94] considered search problems in FNP that are total, i.e.
their decision version is always affirmative and thus a solution must always exist. This totality
property makes the definition of FNP inadequate to capture the intrinsic complexity of total prob-
lems in the appropriate way as it was first shown in [JPY88]. Moreover, there were evidences for
the hardness of total search problems e.g. in [HPV89]. Megiddo and Papadimitriou [MP89] de-
fined the class TFNP that contains the total search problems of FNP, and Papadimitriou [Pap94]
proposed the following classification rule of problems in TFNP:
Total search problems should be classified in terms of the profound mathematical
principles that are invoked to establish their totality.
Along these lines, many subclasses for TFNP have been defined. Johnson, Papadimitriou and
Yannakakis [JPY88] defined the class PLS. A few years later, Papadimitriou [Pap94] defined
the complexity classes PPA, PPAD, PPADS and PPP, each one associated with a profound
mathematical principle in accordance with the above classification rule. More recently, the classes
CLS and PWPP were defined in [DP11] and [Jer16], respectively. In Section 1.1 we give a high-
level description of all these classes.
Finding complete problems for the above classes is important as it enhances our understand-
ing of the underlying mathematical principles. In turn, such completeness results reveal equiv-
alences between total search problems, that seemed impossible to discover without invoking the
definition of these classes. Since the definition of these classes in [JPY88, Pap94] it was clear that
the completeness results about problems that don’t have explicitly a Turing machine or a circuit
as a part of their input are of particular importance. For this reason it has been established to call
such problems natural in the context of the complexity of total search problems (see [FRG18]).
Many natural complete problems are known for PLS and PPAD, and recently natural complete
problems for PPA were identified too (see Section 1.1). However, no natural complete problems
are known for the classes PPP, PWPP that have profound connections with the hardness of
important cryptographic primitives, as we explain later in detail.
Our Contributions. Our main contribution is to provide the first natural complete problems for
PPP and PWPP, and thus solve a longstanding open problem from [Pap94]. Beyond that, our
PPP completeness results lead the way towards answering important questions in cryptography
and lattice theory as we highlight below.
Universal Collision-Resistant Hash Function. Building on the inherent connection of PWPP
with collision-resistant hash functions, we construct a natural hash function family ℋcSIS with the
following properties:
- Worst-Case Universality. No efficient algorithm can find a collision in every function of
the family ℋcSIS, unless worst-case collision-resistant hash functions do not exist.
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Moreover, if an (average-case hard) collision-resistant hash function family exists, then there
exists an efficiently samplable distribution 𝒟 over ℋcSIS, such that (𝒟,ℋcSIS) is an (average-
case hard) collision-resistant hash function family.
- Average-Case Hardness. No efficient algorithm can find a collision in a function chosen
uniformly at random from ℋcSIS, unless we can efficiently find short lattice vectors in any
(worst-case) lattice.
The first property of ℋcSIS is reminiscent of the existence of worst-case one-way functions from the
assumption that P ̸= NP [Sel92]. The corresponding assumption for the existence of worst-case
collision-resistance hash functions is assuming FP ̸= PWPP, but our hash function family ℋcSIS
is the first natural definition that does not involve circuits, and admits this strong completeness
guarantee in the worst-case.
The construction and properties of ℋcSIS lead us to the first candidate of a natural and uni-
versal collision-resistant hash function family. The idea of universal constructions of cryptographic
primitives was initiated by Levin in [Lev87], who constructed the first universal one-way func-
tion and followed up by [Lev03, KN09]. Using the same ideas we can also construct collision a
universal collision-resistant hash function family as we describe in Appendix C. The constructed
hash function though invokes in the input an explicit description of a Turing machine and hence
it fails to be natural, with the definition of naturality that we described before. In contrast, our
candidate construction is natural, simple, and could have practical applications.
Complexity of Lattice Problems in PPP. The hardness of lattice problems in NP∩ coNP [AR04]
has served as the foundation for numerous cryptographic constructions in the past two decades.
This line of work was initiated by the breakthrough work of Ajtai [Ajt96], and later developed in
a long series of works (e.g. [AD97, MR07, Reg09, GPV08, Pei09, GVW13, BLP+13, BV14, GSW13,
GVW15b, GKW17, WZ17, PRSD17]). This wide use of search (approximation) lattice problems
further motivates their study.
We make progress in understanding this important research front by showing that:
1. the computational problem BLICHFELDT associated with Blichfeldt’s theorem, which can
be viewed as a generalization of Minkowski’s theorem, is PPP-complete,
2. the cSIS problem, a constrained version of the Short Integer Solution (SIS), is PPP-complete,
3. we combine known results and techniques from lattice theory to show that most approxi-
mation lattice problems are reducible to BLICHFELDT and cSIS.
These results create a new path towards a better understanding of lattice problems in terms
of complexity classes.
Complexity of Other Cryptographic Assumptions. Besides lattice problems, we discuss the
relationship of other well-studied cryptographic assumptions and PPP. Additionally, we formu-
late a white-box variation of the generic group model for the discrete logarithm problem [Sho97];
we observe that this problem is in PPP and is another natural candidate for being PPP-complete.
1.1 Related Work
In this section we discuss the previous work on the complexity of total search problems, that has
drawn attention from the theoretical computer science community over the past decades. We
start with a high-level description of the total complexity classes and then discuss the known
results for each one of them.
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PLS. The class of problems whose totality is established using a potential function argument.
Every finite directed acyclic graph has a sink.
PPA. The class of problems whose totality is proved through a parity argument.
Any finite graph has an even number of odd-degree nodes.
PPAD. The class of problems whose totality is proved through a directed parity argument.
All directed graphs of degree two or less have an even number of degree one nodes.
PPP. The class of problems whose totality is proved through a pigeonhole principle argument.
Any map from a set S to itself either is onto or has a collision.
Using the same spirit two more classes were defined after [Pap94], in [DP11] and [Jer16].
CLS. The class of problems whose totality is established using both a potential function argu-
ment and a parity argument.
PWPP. The class of problems whose totality is proved through a weak pigeonhole principle.
Any map from a set S to a strict subset of S has a collision.
Figure 1: The classes PPP and
PWPP in the TFNP world.
Recently, a syntactic analog PTFNP of the semantic class
TFNP has been defined in [GP17], and a complete problem
for this class has been identified. It has also been shown that
all the classes we described above are subsets of PTFNP. Ora-
cle separations between all these classes are known [BCE+98],
with the only exception of whether PLS is contained in PPAD.
PLS-completeness. The class PLS represents the complex-
ity of local optimization problems. Some important problems
that have been shown to be PLS-complete are: Local Max-
Cut [SY91], Local Travelling Salesman Problem [Pap92], and
Finding a Pure Nash Equilibrium [FPT04]. Recently, impor-
tant results for the smoothed complexity of the Local Max-Cut
problem were shown in [ER17, ABPW17].
PPAD-completeness. Arguably, the most celebrated applica-
tion of the complexity of total search problems is the charac-
terization of the computational complexity of finding a Nash
equilibrium in terms of PPAD-completeness [DGP09, CDT09].
This problem lies in the heart of game theory and economics.
The proof that Nash Equilibrium is PPAD-complete initiated
a long line of research in the intersection of computer sci-
ence and game theory and revealed connections between the
two scientific communities that were unknown before (e.g.
[EGG06, CDDT09, VY11, KPR+13, CDO15, Rub15, Rub16, CPY17, SSB17]).
PPA-completeness. PPA-complete problems usually arise as the undirected generalizations
of their PPAD-complete analogs. For example, Papadimitriou [Pap94] showed that Sperner’s
Lemma in a 3-D cube is PPAD-complete and later Grigni [Gri01] showed that Sperner’s Lemma
in a 3-manifold consisting of the product of a Möbius strip and a line segment is PPA-complete.
Since Möbius strip is non-orientable, this indeed is a non-directed version of the Sperner’s
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Lemma. Similarly, other problems have been showed to be PPA-complete, all involving some
circuit as an input in their definition [ABB15, DEF+16, BIQ+17]. Recently, the first natural PPA-
complete problem, without a circuit as part of the input, has been identified in [FRG18]. This
illustrates an interesting relation between PPA and complexity of social choice theory problems.
CLS-completeness. The CLS class was defined in [DP11] to capture the complexity of problems
such as P-matrix LCP, computing KKT-points, and finding Nash equilibria in congestion and
network coordination games. Recently, it has been proved that the problem of finding a fixed
point whose existence invokes Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem, is CLS-complete [DTZ18, FGMS17].
TFNP and cryptography. The connection of TFNP and cryptography was illustrated by Pa-
padimitriou in [Pap94], where he proved that if PPP = FP then one-way permutations cannot
exist. In [BO06], a special case of integer factorization was shown to be in PPA ∩ PPP. This
was generalized in [Jer16] by proving that the problem of factoring integers is in PPA ∩ PPP
under randomized reductions. Recently, strong cryptographic assumptions were used to prove
the average-case hardness of PPAD and CLS [BPR15, GPS16, HY17]. In [RSS17] it was shown
that average-case PPAD hardness does not imply one-way function under black-box reductions,
whereas in [HNY17] it was shown that any hard on average problem in NP implies the average
case hardness of TFNP. Finally, in [KNY17] it is proved that the existence of multi-collision re-
sistant hash functions is equivalent with a variation of the total search problem RAMSEY, which
is not known to belong to any of the above complexity classes. Interestingly, they prove that a
variation of RAMSEY called colorful-Ramsey (C-RAMSEY) is PWPP-hard. Although this an impor-
tant result, the problem C-RAMSEY still invokes a circuit in the input and in not known to be in
PWPP, hence does not resolve the problem of identifying a natural complete problem for PWPP.
TFNP and lattices. In [BJP+15] it was shown that the computational analog of Minkowski’s
theorem (namely MINKOWSKI) is in PPP, was conjectured that it is also PPP-complete. The
authors justified their conjecture by showing that EQUAL-SUMS, a problem from [Pap94] that is
conjectured to be PPP-complete, reduces to MINKOWSKI. Additionally, they show that a number
theoretic problem called DIRICHLET reduces to MINKOWSKI, and thus is in PPP. In [HRRY17] it
is proven that the problem NUMBER-BALANCING is equivalent to a polynomial approximation
of Minkowski’s theorem in the `2 norm (via Cook reductions for both directions).
1.2 Roadmap of the paper
We start our exposition with a brief description of the results contained in this paper. First we
briefly describe the PPP-completeness of BLICHFELDT that illustrates some of the basic ideas
behind our main result that cSIS is PPP-complete. The complete proof of the PPP-completeness
of BLICHFELDT can be found in Section 3. We suggest to readers that have experience with the
fundamental concepts of the theory of lattices to skip the details Section 3.
Then, we present a brief description of our main theorem and its proof. The complete proof
of the PPP-completeness of cSIS can be found in Section 4.
In Section 5 we describe the PPP-completeness of a weaker version of cSIS and its relation
with the definition of the first natural universal collision resistant hash function family in the
worst-case sense. This proof also provides the first candidate for a collision resistant hash func-
tion family that is both natural and universal in the average-case sense.
Finally in Section 6 we present, for completeness of our exposition, other lattice problems that
are already known to belong to PPP and PWPP and in Section 7 we present more general other
cryptographic assumptions that belong to PPP and PWPP.
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1.3 Overview of the Results
Before we describe our results in more detail we define the class PPP more formally. The class
PPP contains the set of problems that are reducible to the PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem. The
input to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT is a binary circuit 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and its output is either
an
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n such that 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
0, or a pair
¯
x,
¯
y ∈ {0, 1}n such that
¯
x ̸=
¯
y and 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
Our first and technically most challenging result is to identify and prove the PPP-completeness
of two problems, both of which share similarities with lattice problems. For our exposition,
a lattice ℒ ⊆ Zn can be viewed as a finitely generated additive subgroup of Zn. A lattice
ℒ = ℒ(B) := B ·Zn is generated by a full-rank matrix B ∈ Zn×n, called basis. In the rest of this
section we also use the fundamental parallelepiped of ℒ defined as 𝒫(ℒ) := B · [0, 1)n.
1.3.1 BLICHFELDT is PPP-complete.
We define the BLICHFELDT problem as the computational analog of Blichfeldt’s theorem (see
Theorem 3.1). Its input is a basis for a lattice ℒ ⊆ Zn and a set S ⊆ Zn of cardinality greater
or equal to the volume of 𝒫(ℒ). Its output is either a point in S that belongs to ℒ, or for two
(different) points in S such that their difference belongs to ℒ. In the overview below, we explain
why such an output always exists. Notice that finding a solution to BLICHFELDT becomes trivial
if the input representation of S has length proportional to its size, i.e. one can iterate over all
element pairs of S. The problem becomes challenging when S is represented succinctly. We
introduce a notion for a succinct representation of sets that we call value function. Informally, a
value function for a set S is a small circuit that takes as input ⌈log(|S|)⌉ bits that describe an
index i ∈ {0, . . . , |S| − 1}, and outputs si ∈ S.
We give a proof overview of our first main theorem, and highlight the obstacles that arise,
along with our solutions.
Theorem 3.5. The BLICHFELDT problem is PPP-complete.
PPP Membership of BLICHFELDT Overview. We denote with [n] the set {0, . . . , n − 1}. We
define the map σ : Zn → 𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn that reduces any point in Zn modulo the parallelepiped to
𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn, i.e. (mod 𝒫(ℒ)). Using σ we can efficiently check the membership of any v ∈ Zn
in ℒ, by checking if σ maps v to the origin. Observe that if σ(x) = σ(y) then x− y ∈ ℒ.
We show in Lemma 3.2 that vol(𝒫(ℒ)) = |𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn|, hence the input requirement for S is
equivalent to |S| ≥ |𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn|. Notice that the points of S after applying the map σ, either
have a collision in 𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn or a preimage of the origin exists in S. It follows by a pigeonhole
argument that a solution to BLICHFELDT always exists. For the rest of this part we assume that
|S| = |𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn| and let n = ⌈log(|S|)⌉.
We construct a circuit 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that on input an appropriate index i, evaluates the
value function of S to obtain si ∈ S, and computes σ(si). The most challenging part of the proof
is to construct an efficient map from σ(S) to [|𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn|] in the following way. We define an
appropriate parallelepiped D = [L1]× [L2]× · · · × [Ln] where the Li are non-negative integers,
and a bijection pi : 𝒫(ℒ)∩Zn → D. Because D is a cartesian product, a natural efficient indexing
procedure exists as described in Lemma 2.1. This allows to map pi(σ(si)) to j ∈ [|𝒫(ℒ) ∩Zn|].
The circuit 𝒞 outputs the binary decomposition of j. It follows that any
¯
x such that 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
0
corresponds to a vector x ∈ S such that σ(x) = 0. On the other hand, a collision 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y)
with
¯
x ̸=
¯
y corresponds to a collision σS(x) = σS(y), where σS is the restriction of σ on S, and
hence x− y ∈ ℒ.
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PPP Hardness of BLICHFELDT Overview. We start with a circuit 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that is
an input to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT. We construct a set S and a lattice ℒ as input to BLICHFELDT
in the following way. The set S contains the elements s
¯
x =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
∈ {0, 1}2n and is represented
succinctly with the value function that maps
¯
x to s
¯
x. Notice that |S| = 2n. The lattice ℒ consists
of all
¯
v ∈ {0, 1}2n that satisfy the equation [0n In] · ¯v = 0 (mod 2). By Lemma 2.3, one canefficiently obtain a basis from this description of ℒ and in addition the volume of 𝒫(ℒ) is at
most 2n. Thus, S and ℒ is a valid input for BLICHFELDT.
The output of BLICHFELDT is either an s
¯
x =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
∈ S ∩ ℒ that (by construction of ℒ)
implies 𝒞(
¯
x) = 0, or two different elements of S, s
¯
x =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
, s
¯
y =
[
¯
y
𝒞(
¯
y)
]
with s
¯
x − s
¯
y ∈ ℒ that
implies
¯
x ̸=
¯
y and (by construction of ℒ) 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
1.3.2 cSIS is PPP-complete.
Part of the input to BLICHFELDT is represented with a value function which requires a small
circuit. As we explained before this makes BLICHFELDT a non-natural problem with the respect
to the definition of naturality in the context of the complexity of total search problems. We now
introduce a natural problem that we call constrained Short Integer Solution (cSIS), and show that
it is PPP-complete. The cSIS problem is a generalization of the well-known Short Integer Solution
(SIS) problem, and discuss their connection in Section 5.2.
The input is A ∈ Zn×mq , G ∈ Zd×mq and b ∈ Zdq , for some positive integer q and m ≥
(n + d)⌈log(q)⌉. The matrix G has the property that for every b we can efficiently find an
x ∈ {0, 1}m such that Gx = b (mod q). We define such matrices as binary invertible. The output
is either a vector x ∈ {0, 1}m such that Ax = 0 (mod q) and Gx = b (mod q), or two different
vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}m such that A(x− y) = 0 (mod q) and Gx = Gy = b (mod q). We give a
proof overview of the next theorem, and a full proof in Section 4.
Theorem 4.11. The cSIS problem is PPP-complete.
PPP Membership of cSIS Overview. We show the membership of cSIS in PPP for the general
class of binary invertible matrices G in Section 4. In order to simplify the exposition, we assume
that q = 2` and G to be the “gadget” matrix concatenated with a random matrix V. That is, G
has the form
[
Id ⊗ γT V
]
where γT = [1, 2, . . . , 2`].
Let A ∈ Zn×mq , G ∈ Zd×mq , and b ∈ Zdq be the input to cSIS. We now explain why m ≥ (n+ d)`
suffices to always guarantee a solution to cSIS. First, observe that the first ` · d columns of G,
corresponding to the gadget matrix [Id ⊗ γT], are enough to guarantee that for every r′ ∈ Zm−`dq
there exists an r such that G
[
r
r′
]
= b (mod q). Hence, there are at least qm−`d solutions to the
equation Gx = b (mod q). Also, there are 2`n possible values for Ax (mod q). By a pigeonhole
argument a solution to cSIS always exists. To complete the membership proof, issues similar to
BLICHFELDT with the circuit representation of the problem instance appear, but we overcome
them using similar ideas.
PPP Hardness of cSIS Overview. We start with a circuit 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n that is an input
to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT. Since the input of PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT is a circuit and the input
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of cSIS is a pair of matrices and a vector, we need to represent this circuit in an algebraic way.
In particular, we device a way to encode the circuit in a binary invertible matrix G and a vector
b. To gain a better intuition of why this is possible, we note that a NAND gate x ∧¯ y = z can
be expressed as the linear modular equation x + y + 2z − w = 2 (mod 4), where x, y, z, w ∈
{0, 1}. By a very careful construction, we can encode these linear modular equations in a binary
invertible matrix G. For further details we defer to Section 4.
Since cSIS with q = 4 returns a vector such that Ax = 0 (mod 4) and PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT
asks for a binary vector such that
¯
x =
¯
0, a natural idea is to let A be of the form [0 In], where the
identity matrix corresponds to the columns representing the output of circuit 𝒞 in G. Finally, we
argue that a solution to cSIS with input A, G and b as constructed above, gives either a collision
or a preimage of zero for the circuit 𝒞 as required.
It can be argued that this reduction shares common ideas with the reduction of 3-SAT to
SUBSET-SUM; this shows the importance of the input conditions for cSIS and hints to the nu-
merous complications that arise in the proof. Without these conditions, we could end up with a
trivial reduction to an NP-hard problem! Fortunately, we are able to show that our construction
satisfies the input conditions of cSIS.
1.3.3 Towards a Natural and Universal Collision-Resistant Rash Family.
PWPP is a subclass of PPP in which a collision always exists; it is not hard to show that variations
of both BLICHFELDT and cSIS are PWPP-complete. We tweak the parameters of valid inputs in
order to guarantee that a collision always exists. The PWPP-complete variation of cSIS, which we
denote by weak-cSIS, gives a function family which is a universal collision-resistant hash function
family in a worst-case sense: if there is a function family that contains at least one function for
which it is hard to find collisions, then our function family also includes a function for which it
is hard to find collisions.
We now describe the differences of cSIS and weak-cSIS. As before we assume that q = 2`.
The input to weak-cSIS is a matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , and a binary invertible matrix G ∈ Zd×mq . Notice
that there is no vector b in the input, and the relation between n, m, d and ` is that m has to be
strictly greater that `(n+ d). Namely, m > `(n+ d). This change in the relation of the parameters
might seem insignificant, but is actually very important, as it allows us to replace b in cSIS by the
zero vector. This transforms weak-cSIS into a pure lattice problem: on input matrices A, G with
corresponding bases BA and BG, where G is binary invertible, find two vectors x and y such that
x, y ∈ ℒ(BG) and x− y ∈ ℒ(BA).
The great resemblance of weak-cSIS with SIS and its completeness for PWPP lead us to the
first candidate for a universal collision-resistant hash function ℋcSIS = {h
¯
s : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k′}:
- The key
¯
s is a pair of matrices (A, G), where G is binary invertible.
- Given a key
¯
s = (A, G) and a binary vector
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k, h
¯
s(¯
x) is the binary decomposition
of Au (mod q), where u =
[
r
¯
x
]
such that Gu = 0 (mod q).
Because lattice problems have worst-to-average case reductions and our hash family is based
on a lattice problem, this gives hope for showing that our construction is universal in the average-
case sense.
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1.3.4 Other Lattice Problems Known to be in PPP.
We show that the computational analog of Minkowski’s theorem, namely MINKOWSKI, is in PPP
via a Karp-reduction to BLICHFELDT. We note that a Karp-reduction showing MINKOWSKI ∈
PPP was shown in [BJP+15]. Based on these two problems and the known reductions between
lattice problems, we conclude that a variety of lattice (approximation) problems belong to PPP;
the most important among them are n-SVP, O˜(n)-SIVP and n2.5-CVP (see Figure 2).
1.3.5 Other Cryptographic Assumptions in PPP.
By the definition, the class PWPP contains all cryptographic assumptions that imply collision-
resistant hash functions. These include the factoring of Blum integers, the Discrete Logarithm
problem overZ*p and over elliptic curves, and the SIS lattice problem (a special case of weak-cSIS).
Also, Jerˇábek [Jer16] showed that the problem of factoring integers is in PWPP.
We extend the connection between PPP and cryptography by introducing a white-box model
to describe general groups, which we define to be cyclic groups with a succinct representation of
their elements and group operation (i.e. a small circuit). We show that the Discrete Logarithm
over general groups is in PPP. An example of a general group is Z*q . These connections are also
summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Solid arrows denote a Karp reduction, and dashed arrows denote a Cook reduction.
1.4 Open questions.
Numerous new questions arise from our work and the connections we draw between PPP, cryp-
tography and lattices. We summarize here some of them.
Open Problem 1.1. Is there a worst-to-average case reduction from weak-cSIS to itself?
This result will provide the first natural, in the sense that does not invoke explicitly a Turing
machine in the input, and universal collision resistant hash function family.
Open Problem 1.2. Is SIS or MINKOWSKI PPP-hard?
Open Problem 1.3. Is γ-SVP in PPP for γ = o(n)?
Open Problem 1.4. Is γ-CVP PPP-hard for γ = Ω(
√
n)?
Open Problem 1.5. Is the discrete logarithm problem in PPP for general elliptic curves?
8
2 Preliminaries
General Notation. Let [m] be the set {0, . . . , m− 1}, N = {0, 1, 2, . . . } and Z+ = {1, 2, 3, . . . } We
use small bold letters x to refer to real vectors in finite dimension Rd and capital bold letters A
to refer to matrices in Rd×`. For a matrix A, we denote by aTi its i-th row and by ai,j its (i, j)-th
element. Let In denote the n-dimensional identity matrix. We denote with Ei,j the matrix that has
all zeros except that ei,j = 1. A function negl(k) is negligible if negl(k) < 1/kc for any constant
c > 0 and sufficiently large k. All logarithms log(·) are in base 2.
Vector Norms. We define the `p-norm of x ∈ Rd to be ‖x‖p =
(
∑i x
p
i
)1/p
and the `∞-norm of x to
be ‖x‖∞ = maxi|xi|. For simplicity we use ‖·‖ for the `2-norm instead of ‖·‖2. It is well known
that ‖x‖p ≤ n1/p−1/q‖x‖q for p ≤ q and ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖q for p > q.
2.1 Complexity Classes and Reductions
Binary Strings and Natural Numbers. We use bold and underlined small letters to refer to
binary strings. Binary strings
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k of length k can also be viewed as vectors in Zk. Every
binary string
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k can be mapped to a non negative integer number through the nonlinear
map bc : {0, 1}* → Z+ called bit composition, where bc(¯x) = ∑
k−1
i=0 ¯
xk−i2i. It is trivial to see that
actually bc is a bijective mapping and hence we can define the inverse mapping bd : Z+ → {0, 1}*
called bit decomposition, which is also trivial to compute for any given number m ∈ Z+.
The bit decomposition function bd is extended to integer vectors and the result is the concate-
nation of the bit decomposition of each coordinate of the vector. Similarly, this is also extended
to integer matrices. Then of course the bit composition function bc is no longer well defined
because its output can be either a number or a vector of numbers, but for simplicity we still use
the notation bc and it will be made clear from the context whether the output is a number or a
vector of numbers. When bd is applied to a set {m1, . . . , mk} the output is still a set with the bit
decomposition of each element {bd(m1), . . . , bd(mk)}.
Boolean Circuits. A boolean circuit 𝒞 with n inputs and 1 output is represented as a labeled
directed acyclic graph with in-degree at most 2, with exactly n source nodes and exactly 1 sink
node. Each source node is an input of 𝒞 and the sink node is the output of 𝒞. Each of the input
nodes of 𝒞 is labeled with a number in [n] denoting the ordering of the input variables. Each node
with in-degree 1 is labeled with one of the 2 boolean functions with 1 variable {id,¬}. Each node
with in-degree 2 can be labeled with one of the 16 boolean function with two variables, but for
our purposes we are going to use only the following five boolean functions: nand, nor, xor, and, or,
with corresponding symbols { ∧¯ , ∨¯ ,⊕,∧,∨}. Every boolean circuit defines a boolean function
on n variables 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Let
¯
x be a binary string of length n, i.e.
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n. The value
𝒞(
¯
x) of the circuit on input
¯
x is computed by evaluating of 𝒞 one by one in a topological sorting
of 𝒞, starting from the input nodes. Then, 𝒞(
¯
x) is the value of the output node. The size |𝒞| of 𝒞
is the number of nodes in the graph that represents 𝒞.
Circuits. We can now define a circuit 𝒞 with n inputs and m outputs as an ordered tuple of
m boolean circuits 𝒞 = (𝒞1, . . . , 𝒞m) which defines a function 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where
𝒞(
¯
x) = (𝒞1(¯x), . . . , 𝒞m(¯x)). The size |𝒞| of 𝒞 is equal to |𝒞1| + · · · + |𝒞2|. It is known that
P ⊆ P/poly (see [AB09]), where P/poly is the class of polynomial-sized circuits. Thus, any
polynomial time procedure we describe, implies an equivalent circuit of polynomial size.
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Search Problems. A search problem in FNP is defined by a relation ℛ that on input x of size n
and for every y of size poly(n), ℛ(x, y) is polynomial-time computable on n. A solution to the
search problem with input x is a y of size poly(n) such that ℛ(x, y) holds.
A search problem is total if for every input x of size n, there exists a y of size poly(n) such that
ℛ(x, y) holds. The class of total search problems in FNP is called TFNP.
Karp Reductions Between Search Problems. A search problem 𝒫1 is Karp-reducible to a search
problem 𝒫2 if there exist polynomial-time (in the input size of 𝒫1) computable functions f and
g such that if x is an input of 𝒫1, then f (x) is an input of 𝒫2 and if y is any solution of 𝒫2 with
input f (x) then g(x, f (x), y) is a solution of 𝒫1.
Cook Reductions Between Search Problems. A search problem 𝒫1 is Cook-reducible to a search
problem 𝒫2 if there exists a polynomial-time (in the input size of 𝒫1) oracle Turing machine 𝒯
such that if x is an input of 𝒫1, 𝒯 computes a y such that y is a solution of 𝒫1 whenever all
the oracle answers are solutions of 𝒫2. The set of all search problems that are Cook-reducible to
problem 𝒫 is denoted by FP𝒫 .
The PPP Complexity Class. The class PPP is a subclass of TFNP and consists of all search
problems Karp-reducible to the following problem called PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT.
PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT Problem.
Input: A circuit 𝒞 with n inputs and n outputs.
Output: One of the following:
1. a binary vector
¯
x such that 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
0, or
2. two binary vectors
¯
x ̸=
¯
y, such that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
The weak PPP Complexity Class. The class PWPP is the set of all search problems Karp-
reducible to the following problem called COLLISION.
COLLISION Problem.
Input: A circuit 𝒞 with n inputs and m outputs with m < n.
Output: Two binary vectors
¯
x ̸=
¯
y, such that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
2.2 Set Description Using Circuits
Let S ⊆ Nn and let bd(S) ⊆ {0, 1}k, i.e. the elements of S can be represented using k bits. As
we will see later there is an inherent connection between proofs of both the inclusion and the
hardness of PPP and the succinct representation of subsets S using circuits. We define here three
such representations: the characteristic function, the value function and the index function.
Characteristic Function. We say that a circuit 𝒞ℋS with k binary inputs and one output is a
characteristic function representation of S if 𝒞ℋS(¯x) = 1 if and only if ¯x ∈ bd(S).
Value Function. Let (s,𝒱S) be a tuple where 𝒱S is a circuit with ⌈log(s)⌉ binary inputs and k
outputs and s ∈ Z+. Let f(s,𝒱S) : [s] → {0, 1}k be a function such that f(s,𝒱S)(bc(¯x)) = 𝒱S(¯x) forall
¯
x with bc(
¯
x) < s. Then, (s,𝒱S) is a value function representation of S if and only if f(s,𝒱S) is a
bijective map between [s] and bd(S). The value 𝒱S(¯x) can be arbitrary when bc(¯x) ≥ s.
Index Function. Let (s, ℐS) be a tuple where ℐS is a circuit with k binary inputs and ⌈log(s)⌉
outputs and s ∈ Z+. Let f(s,ℐS) : bd(S)→ [s] be a function such that f(s,ℐS)(¯x) = bc(ℐS(¯x)) for all
¯
x ∈ bd(S). Then, (s, ℐS) is an index function representation of S if and only if f(s,ℐS) is a bijective
map between bd(S) and [s]. The value ℐS(¯x) can be arbitrary when ¯x ̸∈ bd(S).
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Some remarks about the above definitions are in order. First, given a succinct representation
of S it is computationally expensive to compute |S|, thus we provide it explicitly using s. Second,
even though the input and the output of each circuit have to be binary vectors, we abuse notation
and let the input of the index function and the characteristic function, and the output of the value
function to be a element in Nn. Formally, according to the above definitions the output of 𝒱S
is the bit decomposition of an element in S, namely bc(𝒱S(¯x)) ∈ S. In the rest of the paper, weabuse notation and drop bc to denote by 𝒱S(¯x) the vector in S. Similarly, we drop bc and bd forthe characteristic and the index functions.
To illustrate the definitions of succinct representations of sets, we explain how to define them
in the simple case of the set ([0, L1]× · · · × [0, Ln]) ∩Zn. Although this is a simple example, it is
an ingredient that we need when we show the connection of lattice problems with the class PPP.
Lemma 2.1. Let L1, . . . , Ln > 0 and S = ([0, L1]× · · · × [0, Ln]) ∩Zn. Then, the following exist:
1. a characteristic function representation 𝒞ℋS of S, where |𝒞ℋS| = O(n maxi log Li),
2. a value function representation (𝒱S, s) of S, where |𝒱S| = O(n2 maxi log Li) and
3. an index function representation (ℐS, s) of S, where |ℐS| = O(n2 maxi log Li).
Proof. Let `1 = ⌊L1⌋+ 1, . . . , `n = ⌊Ln⌋+ 1.
1. Given the bit decomposition of a vector x ∈ Zn, we can easily test if x belongs to S by
checking whether xi ≤ `i for all i. Such a comparison needs O(log Li) boolean gates and
hence the size of 𝒞ℋS is O(n maxi log Li).
2. Let k be the input number to our value function, the vector that we assing to k is the k-th
vector in the lexicographical ordering of the elements in bd(S). We compute this vector
x ∈ Zn coordinate by coordinate. We start from x1. Observe for any t ∈ Z+, the number of
vectors in S with x1 = t is equal to ∏ni=2 `i and hence the number of vectors with x1 ≤ t is
equal to (t + 1) ·∏ni=2 `i. Therefore, x1 = ⌊k/∏ni=2 `i⌋. Then, the dimension of the problem
reduces by one and therefore we can repeat the same procedure to compute x2 as the
first coordinate of the (k− (∏ni=2 `i) · ⌊k/∏ni=2 `i⌋)-th vector in the set S′ = ([0, L2]× · · · ×
[0, Ln]) ∩Zn−1. Then we apply the procedure recursively. Moreover, this whole task can be
made into an iterative procedure, with a circuit of size O(n2 maxi log Li).
3. Let x ∈ S be the vector whose index we want to compute. The index that we assign to this
vector is its position in the lexicographical ordering of the vectors in bd(S). The number
of vectors y ∈ S with y1 < x1 that are before x in the lexicographical ordering is equal
to (x1 − 1) ·∏ni=2 `i. Therefore, using the recursion of the construction of the circuit for
the value function of S above, we see that the lexicographical index can be computed by a
circuit of size O(n2 maxi log Li).
In the next sections, the constructions of value and index functions for sets lie at the heart of
our proofs for showing membership in PPP, and we make frequent use of the above Lemma 2.1.
Specifically, in Section 3, we see that the set of integer cosets of a lattice admits an index function
that can be implemented with a polynomial sized circuit, and in Section 7 we see that any cyclic
group admits a value function that can be implemented with a polynomial-size circuit. In the
latter case, we demonstrate that an efficient implementation of an index function of a group
shows that the Discrete Logarithm problem for this group belongs to the class PPP.
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2.3 Lattice Basics
Lattice. A n-dimensional lattice ℒ ⊂ Rn is the set of all integer linear combinations of d linearly
independent vectors B = (b1, . . . , bd) in Rn, ℒ = ℒ(B) =
{
∑di=1 aibi : ai ∈ Z
}
. The integer d
is the rank of the lattice, and if it is equal to the dimension n we refer to ℒ as full-rank. The
matrix B is called the basis of lattice ℒ(B). Unless explicitly stated, the lattices on all definitions,
statements and proofs are assumed to be full-rank integer lattices. Our results can be easily
extended to d-rank lattices, but for ease of exposition we present only the full-rank case. A useful
lemma we will use is the following:
Lemma 2.2. Let B ∈ Zn×n, U ∈ Zn×n be a unimodular matrix, i.e. det(U) = ±1, then ℒ(B) = ℒ(BU).
Smith Normal Form. A matrix D ∈ Zn×n is in Smith Normal Form (SNF) if it is diagonal and
di+1,i+1 divides di,i for 1 ≤ i < n. Moreover, any non-singular matrix A ∈ Zn×n can be written
as A = UDV, where D ∈ Zn×n is a unique matrix in SNF, and U, V ∈ Zn×n are unimodular
matrices. Also, the matrices U, D, V can be computed in polynomial-time in n [KV05].
Dual Lattice. The dual lattice ℒ* is defined as the set of all vectors in the span of B that have
integer inner product with ℒ. That is, ℒ* = {y ∈ span(B) : ∀x ∈ ℒ, ⟨y, x⟩ ∈ Z}.
q-ary Lattice. A lattice ℒ ⊆ Zn is called a q-ary lattice if (qZ)n ⊆ ℒ. Let A ∈ Zm×n, we define
the following two types of q-ary lattices
Λq(A) =
{
x ∈ Zn | xT = yTA (mod q) where y ∈ Zm
}
, (2.1)
Λ⊥q (A) = {x ∈ Zn | Ax = 0 (mod q)} . (2.2)
The following lemma for q-ary lattices is useful in our proofs. For a simple proof of this Lemma
2.3 we refer to Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of [AP11].
Lemma 2.3. Let A ∈ Zm×nq , then:
1. Λ⊥q (A) = qΛ*q(A) and det
(
Λ⊥q (A)
)
≤ qn,
2. there exists a polynomial-size circuit ℬ𝒮 that on input bd(A) it outputs bd(B) such that B ∈ Zn×m
and Λ⊥q (A) = ℒ(B).
Fundamental Parallelepiped. The fundamental parallelepiped of ℒ(B) is defined as the set
𝒫(B) = {∑ni=1 tibi : 0 ≤ ti < 1}. Given a full-rank lattice ℒ(B), we can define the operator
(mod 𝒫(B)) on vectors in Rn such that y = x (mod 𝒫(B)) if y = B (B−1x− ⌊B−1x⌋).
Determinant. The determinant of a lattice is the volume of the fundamental parallelepiped,
det(ℒ) = √det(BTB) or simply |det(B)| for full-rank lattices.
Lattice Cosets. For every c ∈ Rn we define the lattice coset as ℒ+ c = {x + c : x ∈ ℒ}. Let
B ∈ Zn×n be a set of n linearly independent integer vectors. We define the set of integer cosets of
ℒ(B) as follows Co(ℒ(B)) = {ℒ(B) + c | c ∈ Zn}.
We now state a fundamental relation between Co(ℒ(B)), det(ℒ(B)) and 𝒫(ℒ(B)).
Proposition 2.4. Let B ∈ Zn×n be a set of n-dimensional linearly independent vectors. It holds that
det(ℒ(B)) = |Co(ℒ(B))| = |𝒫(ℒ(B)) ∩Zd|.
For a proof of Proposition 2.4 see the proof of Lemma 3.2.
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3 BLICHFELDT is PPP-Complete
The concept of lattices was introduced by Hermann Minkowski in his influential book Geometrie
der Zahlen [Min10], first published at 1896. In his book, Minkowski developed the theory of the
geometry of numbers and resolved many difficult problems in number theory. His fundamental
theorem, known as Minkowski’s Convex Body Theorem, was the main tool of these proofs.
Despite the excitement created by Minkowski’s groundbreaking work, it was only after 15
years that a new principle in geometry of numbers was discovered. The credit for this discovery
goes to Hans Frederik Blichfeldt, who in 1914 published a paper [Bli14] with his new theorem
and some very important applications in number theory 1.
In this section, we characterize the computational complexity of Blichfeldt’s existence the-
orem and in later sections we discuss its applications (see Section 6). We recall the statement
of Blichfeldt’s theorem below, introduce its computational search version, and prove that it is
PPP-complete.
Theorem 3.1 (Blichfeldt’s Theorem [Bli14]). Let B ∈ Zn×n be a set of n-dimensional linearly indepen-
dent integer vectors and a measurable set S ⊆ Rn. If vol(S) > det(ℒ(B)), then there exist x, y ∈ S with
x ̸= y and x− y ∈ ℒ(B).
A proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in Chapter 9 of [OLD01]. We now define the computational
discrete version of Blichfeldt’s theorem.
BLICHFELDT Problem.
Input: An n-dimensional basis B ∈ Zn×n and a set S ⊆ Zn described by the value function
representation (s,𝒱S).
Output: If s < det(ℒ(B)), then the vector 0. Otherwise, one of the following:
0. a number z ∈ [s] such that 𝒱S(z) ̸∈ S or two numbers z, w ∈ [s] such that 𝒱S(z) = 𝒱S(w),
1. a vector x such that x ∈ S ∩ ℒ,
2. two vectors x ̸= y, such that x, y ∈ S and x− y ∈ ℒ.
Lemma 3.2. BLICHFELDT is in PPP.
Proof. We show a Karp reduction from BLICHFELDT to the PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem.
Let B and (s,𝒱S) be the inputs of BLICHFELDT. We define the lattice ℒ = ℒ(B) and R =
𝒫(B) ∩Zn to be the set of all the integer vectors in the fundamental parallelepiped 𝒫(B). Let
` = ⌈log(det(ℒ))⌉ and m = ⌈log(s)⌉. We remark that ` = ⌈log(|R|)⌉ (see Proposition 2.4) and m
is equal to the number of binary inputs of 𝒱S. Our goal is to construct a circuit 𝒞 with ` inputs
and ` outputs such that given a solution of the PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem with input 𝒞,
we efficiently find a solution of BLICHFELDT. If s < det(ℒ), then we output 0 without invoking
PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT. Therefore, for the rest of the proof we focus on the case s ≥ det(ℒ)
which implies m ≥ `. We can also assume without loss of generality that s = det(ℒ). If this
is not the case, then we can equivalently work with the set S′ which is described by the value
function representation (det(ℒ),𝒱 ′S), where 𝒱 ′S has ` inputs and outputs the value of 𝒱S after
padding the input with m− ` inputs in the most significant bits. We do this so that the input
conditions of PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT are satisfied. For simplicity, we assume S = S′ for the rest
of the proof.
1These introductory paragraphs were inspired from Chapter 9 of [OLD01].
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Before defining 𝒞, we note that numbers that satisfy case “0.” in the output of BLICHFELDT
exist if and only if (s,𝒱S) is not a valid value function of S. Therefore, an output of case “0.”
certifies that the input of BLICHFELDT is not a valid input.
First, let us assume that det(ℒ) = 2`. Intuitively, we want 𝒞 to be a mapping from any vector
x ∈ S to the integer coset of x in Co(ℒ). A useful observation is that if two vectors in S belong
to the same coset, then their difference belongs to ℒ. The first step to implement this idea is to
find a set of representatives for Co(ℒ). The set R of integer vectors in 𝒫(B) is such a set. Finally,
to finish the construction of 𝒞 we need an index function representation of R, so that the output
of 𝒞 is in {0, 1}`. When det(ℒ) ̸= 2` we need to make some simple changes in the reduction, we
decribe these changes at the end of the proof.
The main difficulty that we encounter in formalizing the above intuition hides in the con-
struction of a polynomial-size circuit ℐR for the index function of the set R. Let r = |R|. We
define the circuit ℐR : bd(R) → {0, 1}` such that ℐR defines a bijective map between bd(R) and
bd([r]). The circuit ℐR first computes the Smith Normal Form of the basis B = UDV, which can
be done by a circuit that has size polynomial in |bd(B)| [KV05], then uses the index function of
the set 𝒫(D) ∩Zn, as defined in Lemma 2.1, to map each element of R to a number in [r].
Claim 3.3. There exists a bijection pi between R and 𝒫(D) ∩ Zn, which can be implemented by a
polynomial-size circuit.
Proof of Claim 3.3. In the Smith Normal Form of B, we have that U ∈ Zn×n, V ∈ Zn×n are
unimodular matrices and D ∈ Zn×n is a diagonal matrix. Since V is unimodular by Lemma 2.2,
ℒ(DV) = ℒ(D) and, hence, D is a basis of ℒ(DV). This implies that the function φ(x) =
x (mod 𝒫(D)) is a bijection between 𝒫(DV) ∩Zn and 𝒫(D) ∩Zn, with inverse map φ−1(y) =
y (mod 𝒫(DV)). Observe that both φ and φ−1 can be implemented with a polynomial-size
circuit. By the unimodularity of U, the map h(x) = U−1x defines a bijection between 𝒫(B) ∩
Zn and 𝒫(DV) ∩Zn, with h−1(y) = Uy. As above, both h and h−1 can be implemented by
polynomial-size circuits. Hence, the function pi(x) = h(φ(x)) is a bijection between R = 𝒫(B) ∩
Zn and 𝒫(D) ∩Zn with inverse map pi−1(y) = φ−1(h−1(y)) 2. The size of the circuits that
implement pi and pi−1 is also polynomial.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. By the unimodularity of U and V we have that det(D) = det(B). Since D
is diagonal, the number of integer points in 𝒫(D) is equal to det(ℒ(D)). Hence, |𝒫(B) ∩Zn| =
|𝒫(D) ∩Zn| = det(ℒ(D)) = det(ℒ(B)).
Now we are ready to describe ℐR. Let D = diag(d1, . . . , dn), observe that
RD = {x ∈ Zn such that x ∈ 𝒫(D)} = ([0, d1]× · · · × [0, dn]) ∩Zn.
We use Lemma 2.1 to construct an index function ℐRD . Finally, we define the index function of R
as ℐR(x) = ℐRD (pi(x))).
Let σ : Zn → R be the function that computes the modulo 𝒫(B), i.e. σ(x) = x (mod 𝒫(B)).
Now, we have all the components to define our circuit 𝒞 to reduce BLICHFELDT to PPP. The
circuit 𝒞 takes as input a boolean vector
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}` and computes ℐR (σ (𝒱S(¯x))), where ℐR is asdefined above. Namely, the circuit 𝒞 first computes the vector x = 𝒱S(¯x), which belongs in S, thenit computes a vector c ∈ 𝒫(B) such that x ∈ c+ ℒ, maps it to a vector in 𝒫(D) and lastly maps
2The fact that pi is a bijection shows that |𝒫(D) ∩Zn| = |𝒫(B) ∩Zn|.
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this vector to a boolean vector using the index function of RD. Since we assume |R| = 2` we have
that 𝒞 has ` inputs and ` outputs and hence it is a valid input to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT. Any
solution of this PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT instance gives a solution to our BLICHFELDT instance.
The PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT with input 𝒞 returns one of the following:
1. a boolean vector
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}` such that 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
0.
If 𝒱S(bc(¯x)) ̸∈ S, then bc(¯x) is a solution to our initial BLICHFELDT instance. Otherwise,let y = σ (𝒱S(¯x)) and ¯
y = bd(y). In this case, we have that ℐR(
¯
y) =
¯
0, which implies that
ℐRD (pi(y)) = ¯0. From the definition of ℐRD in Lemma 2.1, we get that pi(y) = 0 and hencey = 0. Finally, σ (𝒱S(¯x)) = 0 implies 𝒱S(¯x) ∈ 0 + ℒ and so x = 𝒱S(¯x) is a solution to ourinitial BLICHFELDT instance.
2. two boolean vectors
¯
x,
¯
y ∈ {0, 1}`, such that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
Using the same reasoning as in the previous case we conclude that either bc(
¯
x), bc(
¯
y) is a
solution to our initial BLICHFELDT instance or there exists a c ∈ R such that 𝒱S(¯x),𝒱S(¯
y) ∈
c + ℒ(B) and hence if x = 𝒱S(¯x), y = 𝒱S(¯
y) then we have that x− y ∈ ℒ and so x, y is a
solution to our initial BLICHFELDT instance.
The only thing left to finish the proof is the case in which det(ℒ(B)) < 2`. In this case the circuit
𝒞 is defined as
𝒞(
¯
x) =
{
¯
x if bc(
¯
x) ≥ det(ℒ(B))
ℐR (σ (𝒱S(¯x))) if bc(¯x) < det(ℒ(B))
.
When 𝒞 is as above, there are no solutions
¯
x and
¯
y to the PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem with
input 𝒞 such that bc(
¯
x), bc(
¯
y) ≥ det(ℒ(B)). Hence, all solutions of PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT imply
a solution to our initial BLICHFELDT instance as described before.
We now proceed to show the PPP-hardness of BLICHFELDT.
Lemma 3.4. BLICHFELDT is PPP-hard.
Proof. We prove that PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT is reducible to the BLICHFELDT problem.
Let 𝒞 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be an arbitrary instance of PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT. We construct an
instance of BLICHFELDT based on q-ary lattices as follows. Fix q = 2 and let A = [0 In] ∈
Zn×2n2 , where In is the n-dimensional identity matrix. We define the lattice Λ
⊥
q (A) and using
Lemma 2.3 we compute B = ℬ𝒮(A) such that ℒ(B) = Λ⊥q (A). Next, we define the set S ={[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
such that
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n
}
⊆ Z2n2 . Accordingly, the circuit 𝒱S has 𝒞 hardcoded, and on
input
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n it outputs 𝒱S(¯x) =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
, where
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
is viewed as a vector in Z2n2 and not
as a binary string. Notice that |S| = 2n since for every
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n there is one element in S with
its n-bit prefix equal to
¯
x. Thus, the BLICHFELDT instance is defined by B and (2n,𝒱S). Notice
that for y =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
∈ S we have
Ay = 𝒞(
¯
x) (mod 2). (3.1)
We will see that any solution to the above BLICHFELDT instance gives a solution for the
PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem with input 𝒞. The problem BLICHFELDT returns one of the
following:
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1. a single vector y =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
∈ S ∩ ℒ(B).
Then, by (3.1) it holds that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 0 (mod 2) which means 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
0 and hence
¯
x is a
solution to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT.
2. two vectors x, y ∈ S, such that x ̸= y and x− y ∈ ℒ(B).
In this case, we have x =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
and y =
[
¯
x
𝒞(
¯
x)
]
such that x− y ∈ Λ⊥q (A). Thus, A(x−
y) = 0 (mod 2) which by (3.1) implies 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y), and because x ̸= y it has to be that
¯
x ̸=
¯
y. So, the solution to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT is the pair
¯
x,
¯
y.
Finally, we argue that 2n ≥ det(ℒ(B)) so that the BLICHFELDT problem does not output 0
trivially. This follows directly from Lemma 2.3 since q = 2.
Combining Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.4, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5. BLICHFELDT is PPP-complete.
4 Constrained Short Integer Solution is PPP-Complete
In this section we define the first PPP-complete problem that is natural, i.e. does not explicitly
invoke any circuit as part of its input in contrast to the BLICHFELDT problem. We call this
problem the constrained Short Integer Solution (cSIS) problem because it shares a similar structure
with the well-known and well-studied Short Integer Solution problem that was defined in the
seminal work of Ajtai [Ajt96], and later studied in [Mic04, MR07, GPV08, MP12].
To expand on the complexity theoretic importance and potential of cSIS, we note the SIS
problem is contained in PPP by its collision-resistance nature but it is unknown if it is also PPP-
hard. This poses a fascinating open question, since it implies a unique characterization of a
concrete cryptographic assumption using a complexity class and vice versa. We view our result
in this section (as well as in the next section) as a first step towards this direction, by showing
that cSIS is PPP-complete.
Similar to the presentation of the previous section; we first define cSIS, then prove its PPP
membership and finally show its PPP-hardness. In all these steps, a matrix with a special struc-
ture, that we call binary invertible plays an important role, and thus we define it below and prove
a key property that we use.
Definition 4.1 (Binary Invertible Matrix). Let ` ∈ Z+, q ≤ 2` and d, k ∈N. First, we define the
`-th gadget vector γ` to be the vector γ` =
[
1 2 4 . . . 2`−1
]T ∈ Z`q. Second, let U ∈ Zd×(d·`)q be
a matrix with non-zero elements only above the (`+ 1)-diagonal and V ∈ Zd×kq be an arbitrary
matrix. We define the matrix G =
[
(Id ⊗ γT` +U) V
] ∈ Zd×(d·`+k)q to be a binary invertible matrix.
To illustrate the form of a binary invertible matrix we give an example below with ` = 3, i.e. in
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Z8, where the symbol ? represents any element in Z8.
G =

1 2 4 ? ? ? ? ? ? · · · ? ? ? ? ? · · · ? ?
0 0 0 1 2 4 ? ? ? · · · ? ? ? ? ? · · · ? ?
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 · · · ? ? ? ? ? · · · ? ?
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 2 4 ? ? · · · ? ?


d rows
︸ ︷︷ ︸
d·` columns
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k columns
It is evident from the definition of a binary invertible matrix, that it is not a fixed matrix but
rather a collection of matrices. That is, after we fix q, the exact values of G depend on the choice of
U and V. For example, a special case of a binary invertible matrix is the gadget matrix G = Id⊗γT`
with U = 0d×(d·`) and k = 0, that was defined in [MP12] and used in many cryptographic
constructions (e.g. [GSW13, BGG+14, GVW15b, GVW15a, MW16, BP16, BKM17, BTVW17, PS18]).
Next, we formalize the main property of binary invertible matrices that is in the core of our
proof for the inclusion of cSIS in PPP, and also explains the name “binary invertible”.
Proposition 4.2. Let G =
[
(Id ⊗ γT` +U) V
] ∈ Zd×(d·`+k)q be a binary invertible matrix and r′
be an arbitrary vector in Zkq. Then, for every b ∈ Zdq , there exists a vector r ∈ {0, 1}d·` such that
G
[
r
r′
]
= b (mod q). Additionally, the vector r is computable by a polynomial-size circuit and it is
guaranteed to be unique when q = 2`.
Proof. For a simple illustration of the proposition, for a moment assume that G =
[
W V
] ∈
Z
d×(d+k)
q , where q is prime, W ∈ Zd×dq is an upper triangular matrix, and V ∈ Zk×dq is arbitrary.
Then, for every b ∈ Zdq , using backwards substitution we can efficiently compute a vector x ∈ Zdq
such that G
[
x
r′
]
= b (mod q).
For the general case where G =
[
(Id ⊗ γT` +U) V
]
, we use again backward substitution.
But because we require r to be binary, we make r to be the the binary decomposition of the
corresponding solution in Zq. More precisely, we divide r into d parts of ` coordinates each, such
that r = [r1 . . . rd]T. We define gTi to be the i-th row of the matrix G. Then, the d-th part of r
is equal to rd = bd
(
bd − gTd
[
0
r′
]
(mod q)
)
. Next, we recursively compute the t-th part rt of r,
assuming we have already computed the parts rt+1, . . . , rd. The recursive relation for rt is
rt = bd

bt − gTt

0
...
0
rt+1
rt+2
. . .
rd
r′

(mod q)

, (4.1)
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where b =
[
b1 b2 . . . bd
]T
. The fact that r can be computed by a polynomial sized circuit,
follows easily from (4.1).
In the special case of q = 2`, it is easy to see that for every x ∈ [q] there exists a unique
rt ∈ {0, 1}` such that γT` rt = x (mod q). Additionally, (when q = 2`) for any rt ∈ {0, 1}`, it holds
that γT` rt < q, and thus γ
T
` rt = x over Z. But in this case, rt is the binary decomposition of x, and
it is unique. Because every rt is unique, we get that r is also unique.
Remark 4.3. The property of Proposition 4.2 is the only property of binary invertible matrices that
we need for our proofs. We could potentially define binary invertible matrices in a more general
way. For example, a binary invertible matrix could be a permutation of the columns of a matrix
of Definition 4.1. Our results follow immediately for the more general class of matrices that
satisfy the properties of Proposition 4.2. Let us denote by 𝒮 this set of matrices. We focus on the
more restrictive case of Definition 4.1, not only for ease of the exposition, but also because given
a matrix A there is no known efficient procedure to check whether A ∈ 𝒮 . In fact, this problem
is NP-complete, since we can encode a SUBSET-SUM instance in A and reduce SUBSET-SUM to
checking whether A ∈ 𝒮 . Alternatively, we could define a promise version of cSIS where G, is
promised to be in 𝒮 . However, this would deprive us from a syntactic definition of cSIS.
We now define the Constrained Short Integer Solution problem.
cSIS Problem.
Input: A matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , a binary invertible matrix G ∈ Zd×mq and a vector b ∈ Zdq where
` ∈ Z+, q ≤ 2` and m ≥ (n + d) · `.
Output: One of the following:
1. a vector x ∈ {0, 1}m such that x ∈ Λ⊥q (A) and Gx = b (mod q),
2. two vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}m such that x ̸= y with x−y ∈ Λ⊥q (A) and Gx = Gy = b (mod q).
Lemma 4.4. cSIS is in PPP.
Proof. We show a Karp reduction from cSIS to the PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem that works
for any positive integer q ≥ 2.
Let A ∈ Zn×mq , G ∈ Zd×mq , b ∈ Zdq be the inputs to the cSIS problem and define k = m− d · `.
From the definition of cSIS, we have that k ≥ n · `. We define the circuit 𝒞 that takes as input
a vector
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n·` and outputs a vector
¯
z ∈ {0, 1}n·`. For any input
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n·`, we define
the vector r′ =
[
¯
x
0k−n·`
]
∈ Zkq, and by Proposition 4.2 we compute a vector r ∈ {0, 1}d·` such that
G
[
r
r′
]
= b (mod q). Let 𝒞1 : {0, 1}n·` → {0, 1}d·` be the circuit that on input ¯x computes r.
The circuit 𝒞 on input
¯
x, first use 𝒞1 to compute r = 𝒞1(¯x), and then outputs the binary
decomposition of the vector A
[
r
r′
]
(mod q), where r′ =
[
¯
x
0k−n·`
]
. Overall, the description of 𝒞 is
𝒞(
¯
x) = bd
A
𝒞1(¯x)
¯
x
0k−n·`
 (mod q)
 .
Clearly, this is a polynomial-time computation, and thus the circuit 𝒞 is of polynomial size. To
complete the proof, we show that a solution to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT with input 𝒞, gives a
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solution for the cSIS instance. The output of PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT with input 𝒞 is one of the
following:
1. a vector
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n·` such that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 0n·`.
In this case, for the vector x =
𝒞1(¯x)
¯
x
0
, we get 𝒞(
¯
x) = bd (Ax (mod q)) =
¯
0. Because the
binary decomposition bd defines a bijective map, this implies that Ax = 0 (mod q). Also,
by the definition of 𝒞1, we get that Gx = b (mod q). Hence, x is a solution of cSIS with
input (A, G, b).
2. two vectors
¯
x,
¯
y ∈ {0, 1}n·`, such that
¯
x ̸=
¯
y and 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
In this case, we define the vectors x =
𝒞1(¯x)
¯
x
0
 and y =
𝒞1(¯y)
¯
y
0
 such that
bd (Ax (mod q)) = 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y) = bd (Ay (mod q)) .
Because the binary decomposition bd defines a bijective map, this implies that Ax =
Ay (mod q) and hence A(x− y) = 0 (mod q). Therefore, x− y ∈ Λ⊥q (A). Also, it has to be
the case that x ̸= y, because
¯
x ̸=
¯
y and by the definition of 𝒞1 we get Gx = Gy = b (mod q).
Therefore, x, y form a valid solution for the cSIS problem with input (A, G, b).
Lemma 4.5. cSIS is PPP-hard.
Proof. We show a Karp reduction from PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT to the cSIS problem.
Let 𝒞 = (𝒞1, . . . , 𝒞n) be the input circuit to the PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT problem with n inputs and
n outputs. Also, let d = |𝒞| be the size of 𝒞. As we explained in Section 2.1, we may assume
without loss of generality, that 𝒞 consists of gates in the set { ∧¯ , ∨¯ ,⊕,∧,∨} 3. The circuit 𝒞 is
represented as n directed acyclic graphs. We first describe how to construct from the i-th circuit
𝒞i part of a cSIS instance and then we combine these parts to form a cSIS instance. Let di = |𝒞i|
be the size of 𝒞i and 𝒢(i) =
(
V(i), E(i)
)
be its directed acyclic graph, where V(i) is the set of nodes
of 𝒞i . Let
(
v(i)1 , v
(i)
2 , . . . , v
(i)
di
)
be a topological ordering of the graph 𝒢(i), where the first n nodes
are the source nodes of 𝒢(i) and the last node is the unique sink of 𝒢(i). As we have already
explained in Section 2.1, the source nodes of 𝒢(i) correspond to the inputs of 𝒞i and the sink of
𝒢(i) corresponds to the output of 𝒞i.
We denote by G(i) and b(i) the part of the final cSIS instance that corresponds to circuit 𝒞i.
We prove our hardness result for ` = 2 and q = 4 4. We introduce two variables for each node
of 𝒢(i). The set of the first variable in each pair represents the value of the corresponding node
in the evaluation of 𝒞i and we call it the set of value variables and the set of the second variable
in each pair is the set of auxiliary variables. Let us remind that in the topological ordering of
𝒢(i) we start with the n input nodes v1, . . . , vn, for which we use x1, . . . , xn to represent their
corresponding value variables. The last node of the topological ordering is the output node, and
3In fact, it is well known that only the NAND ( ∧¯ ) gates suffice, but we discuss here the implementation of all these
five gates, because we are going to use them in Section 5.
4At the end of the proof, we also show how to generalize the result for any ` ∈ Z+ and q = 2`
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since it is the i-th output of the circuit 𝒞, we denote its value variable by yi. We denote the
remaining value variables by z(i)n+1, . . . , z
(i)
di−1. Additionally, we denote by w1, . . . , wn the auxiliary
variables that correspond to the input nodes, by ti the auxiliary variable of the output node and
by r(i)n+1, . . . , r
(i)
di−1 the remaining auxiliary variables. We summarize the notation for the variables
in the Table 1. We observe that we may use z(i)j = xj for j ≤ n and z(i)di = yi and the same holds
for the auxiliary variables. Each column of G(i) corresponds to one of these variables.
nodes v(i)1 . . . v
(i)
n v
(i)
n+1 . . . v
(i)
di−1 v
(i)
di
value variables x1 . . . xn z
(i)
n+1 . . . z
(i)
di−1 yi
auxiliary variables w1 . . . wn r
(i)
n+1 . . . r
(i)
di−1 ti
Table 1: The value and auxiliary variables that correspond to every node of the graph 𝒢(i).
Since we focus on a fixed graph 𝒢(i), we occasionally drop the superscript (i) for simplicity.
We reintroduce the superscripts when we combine all matrices G(i) to a matrix G. Our goal is to
define a G(i) and a b(i) such that every binary solution of G(i)s = b(i) (mod 4) corresponds to a
valid evaluation of the circuit 𝒞i.
As explained in Section 2.1, it suffices to assume that the in-degree of every non-input node
is two. Let p1(j) be the index of the first, in the topological ordering, predecessor of the node vj
and p2(j) be the index of the second. Since nodes are indexed in topological ordering we have
that p1(j) < p2(j) < j. Every row of G(i) corresponds to a node vj, with j > n, of 𝒢(i), and
contains the coefficients of the variables in the modular equation of a form that appears in Table
2, depending on the label of vj. We prove the correctness of these equations later in the text but
it becomes also clear from the following Claim 4.6. The proof of Claim 4.6 goes through a simple
enumeration of the different values for the boolean variables and can be found in Appendix A.1.
The equation of node vdi−j defines also the j-th element of b
(i) according to Table 2.
label of vj equation of vj bj
∧¯ rj + 2zj − zp1(j) − zp2(j) = 2 (mod 4) 2
∨¯ rj + 2zj − zp1(j) − zp2(j) = 3 (mod 4) 3
⊕ zj + 2rj − zp1(j) − zp2(j) = 0 (mod 4) 0
∧ rj + 2zj − zp1(j) − zp2(j) = 0 (mod 4) 0
∨ rj + 2zj + zp1(j) + zp2(j) = 0 (mod 4) 0
Table 2: Forms of equation of a non-input node v(i)j of the graph 𝒢(i), depending on its label.
Claim 4.6. Let x, y, z, w ∈ {0, 1}, then the following equivalences holds
1. w + 2z− x− y = 2 (mod 4)⇔ x ∧¯ y = z, w = x⊕ y
2. w + 2z− x− y = 3 (mod 4)⇔ x ∨¯ y = z, w = ¬(x⊕ y)
3. z + 2w− x− y = 0 (mod 4)⇔ x⊕ y = z, w = x ∧ y
4. w + 2z− x− y = 0 (mod 4)⇔ x ∧ y = z, w = x⊕ y
5. w + 2z + x + y = 0 (mod 4)⇔ x ∨ y = z, w = x⊕ y.
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So as we said, each column of G(i) corresponds to a variable, each row of G(i) corresponds
to an equation as described above and b(i) is defined based on the label of each node of 𝒢(i)
according to Table 2. The order of both the rows and the columns is specified by the topological
sorting of 𝒢(i). Specifically, the first row of G(i) describes the equation corresponding to node v(i)di
(the output node of 𝒢(i)), the second row of G(i) describes the equation corresponding to node
v(i)di−1. In general, the k-th row of G
(i) describes the equation corresponding to node v(i)di−k. We
emphasize that, since there are no equations for the input nodes of 𝒢(i), we have di − n equations
in total. The order of columns follows a similar rule, i.e. it corresponds to the reverse order of
the topological ordering of 𝒢(i). The first two columns correspond to variables zdi , rdi of node vdi
followed by pairs of rows corresponding to the variables of all non-input nodes of 𝒢(i). Among
the two columns of each node, the first corresponds to the auxiliary variable and the second to
the value variable, unless the label of the node is “⊕ ”. In the “⊕′′ case, the first corresponds
to the value variable and the second to the auxiliary variable. Finally, G(i) has n columns at the
end for the variables that correspond to the input nodes of 𝒢(i). For the last 2n columns, all
the columns of the value variables precede the columns of the auxiliary variables. These rules
completely define matrix G(i) (see Table 3 for an illustration).
rdi zdi rdi−1 zdi−1 . . . rn+1 zn+1 xn . . . x1 wn . . . w1
eq. of vdi 1 2 ? ? . . . ? ? ? . . . ? 0 . . . 0
eq. of vdi−1 0 0 1 2 . . . ? ? ? . . . ? 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
eq. of vn+1 0 0 0 0 . . . 1 2 ? . . . ? 0 . . . 0
Table 3: Illustration of the matrix G(i) (assuming that 𝒞i has no “⊕′′ gates).
Before defining the final matrix G, we state and prove some basic properties of G(i).
Claim 4.7. The matrix G(i) is binary invertible.
Proof of Claim 4.7. We remind that the dimensions of G(i) are (di − n) × (2di). Because of the
order of rows and columns of G(i), and by the form of the equations of Table 2, we have that
the 1× 2 vectors that appear in the diagonal of G(i) are equal to γT2 =
[
1 2
]
. The only other
non-zero elements of the k-th row of G(i) appear in the columns corresponding to v(i)p1(di−k) and
v(i)p2(di−k). But, by construction v
(i)
p1(di−k) and v
(i)
p2(di−k) are always before v
(i)
di−k in the topological
ordering of 𝒢(i). Therefore, their corresponding columns are after the columns of v(i)di−k. Hence,
the only non-zero elements of G(i) are above its 3rd diagonal. This implies that G(i) has the form[(
Idi−n ⊗ γT2 +U(di−n)×(2(di−n))
)
Vn×(2n)
]
and as shown U(di−n)×(2(di−n)) has non-zero elements
only above the 3rd diagonal. This concludes the claim that G(i) is binary invertible.
Claim 4.8. Let s ∈ {0, 1}2di be a solution to the modular linear equation G(i)s = b(i) (mod 4). Let
¯
x be a
binary string consisting of the value variables of the input nodes, i.e.
¯
x = (s2di−2n+1, s2di−2n+2, . . . , s2di−n+1).
Then, the second coordinate s2 of s is equal to s2 = 𝒞i(¯x).
Proof of Claim 4.8. We inductively prove that the value of the coordinate s2di−2j+2 of s is equal to
the value of the non-input node vj in 𝒢(i) in the evaluation of 𝒞i(¯x).
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Induction Base. By the definition of
¯
x we have that the coordinates (s2di−2n+1, . . . , s2di−n+1) are
equal to the input values.
Inductive Hypothesis. Assume that for any k such that n < k < j the value of the coordinate
s2di−2k+2 of s is equal to the value of the non-input node vk in 𝒢(i) in the evaluation of 𝒞k(¯x).
Inductive Step. The vector s has to satisfy the (di − n− j+ 1)-th modular equation of the system
G(i)s = b(i) (mod 4). Without loss of generality, we assume that the label of vj is “ ∧¯ ”. This
equation then suggests that s2di−2j+1 + 2s2di−2j+2 − s2di−2p1(j)+2 − s2di−2p2(j)+2 = 2 (mod 4) and
by Claim 4.6 we get that
s2di−2j+2 =
(
s2di−2p1(j)+2
)
∧¯
(
s2di−2p2(j)+2
)
. (4.2)
But, from inductive hypothesis we know that s2di−2p1(j)+2 and s2di−2p2(j)+2 take the correct values
of vp1(j) and vp2(j) in the evaluation of 𝒞i(¯x). Hence, from Equation (4.2) we immediately getthat s2di−2j+2 takes the value of node vj. Similarly, we can show the inductive step for all other
possible labels of vj.
For j = di the statement that we just proved through Induction implies that s2 = 𝒞i(¯x).We are finally ready to describe our matrix G and vector b. We remind that di = |𝒞i| and we
define d′i = di − n. Let d = ∑ni=1 d′i. The matrix G is of dimension d× 2(d + n). We remind that
from Claim 4.7 matrices G(i) are binary invertible and hence let U(i) and V(i) the matrices that
satisfy the equation
G(i) =
[(
Id′i ⊗ γT2 +U(i)
)
V(i)
]
. (4.3)
We define G to be equal to
G =

(
Id′1 ⊗ γT2 +U(1)
)
0 . . . 0 V(1)
0
(
Id′2 ⊗ γT2 +U(2)
)
. . . 0 V(2)
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . .
(
Id′n ⊗ γT2 +U(n)
)
V(n)
 , (4.4)
and the vector b to be
b =

b(1)
b(2)
...
b(n)
 . (4.5)
From the definition of G and Claim 4.7 it is immediate that G is binary invertible.
Claim 4.9. The matrix G defined in Equation (4.4) is binary invertible.
Additionally, let ki = 2 + ∑i−1j=1 d
′
j, then the following claim is a simple corollary of Equa-
tions (4.4) and (4.5) and Claim 4.8.
Claim 4.10. Let s ∈ {0, 1}2(d+n) be a solution to the modular linear equation Gs = b (mod 4). Let
also
¯
x the binary string that is equal to the value of the value variables of the input nodes, i.e.
¯
x =
(s2d+1, s2d+2, . . . , s2d+n). Then, the binary string ¯
z = (sk1 , sk2 , . . . , skn) is equal to ¯
z = 𝒞(
¯
x).
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To complete the description of the cSIS instance to which we reduce PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT, we
have to describe also the matrix A. The dimensions of A are n× 2(d + n). We describe as a con-
catenation of three matrices A1 ∈ Zn×2dq , A2 ∈ Zn×nq , A3 ∈ Zn×nq , such that A =
[
A1 A2 A3
]
.
Each row of A1 corresponds to an output of 𝒞 and has a single 1 in the position (i, ki). More
precisely A1 = ∑ni=1 Ei,ki , where Ei,j is the matrix with all zeros except in position (i, j). We also
set A2 = 0 and A3 = 2In which implies A =
[
A1 0 2In
]
(see Table 4 for an illustration).
r(1)d1 z
(1)
d1
. . . r(2)d2 z
(2)
d2
. . . r(n)dn z
(n)
dn
xn . . . x1 wn . . . w1
y1 0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 2 . . . 0
y2 0 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
yn 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 2
Table 4: Illustration of the matrix A (assuming that 𝒞 has no “⊕′′ gates).
At a high level, the first 2s columns of A and G are meant for the description of circuit 𝒞. In
particular, there are two columns for each gate of 𝒞, the first corresponds to an auxilirary variable
and the second to the output of the gate 5. Then, there are n columns corresponding to the input
of 𝒞 and n auxiliary columns, one for each output of 𝒞. Similarly to Lemma 3.4, A has non-zero
elements in the columns corresponding to the n outputs of 𝒞 and G and b play the role of the set
S, namely they guarantee that the output of cSIS will encode
¯
x and 𝒞(
¯
x).
The output of cSIS on input (A, G, b) is one of the following:
1. a vector s ∈ {0, 1}2(n+s) such that s ∈ Λ⊥4 (A) and Gs ≡ b (mod 4).
Let
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n and
¯
y ∈ {0, 1}n be the n input and n output coordinates of s respectively,
i.e.
¯
x = (s2d+1, . . . , s2d+n) and
¯
y = (sk1 , . . . , skn), as defined above. Let ¯
w ∈ {0, 1}n be the
n last coordinates of s. Then, since each row of A has exactly one coordinate equal to 1,
corresponding to a value in
¯
y, and one coordinate equal to 2, corresponding to a coordinate
in
¯
w, Ax = 0 (mod 4) implies both that
¯
y = 0 and
¯
w = 0. We can now use Claim 4.10,
and get that 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
y, which in turn implies that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 0. Hence,
¯
x is a valid solution to
PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT with input 𝒞.
2. two vectors s, t ∈ {0, 1}2(n+s), such that s ̸= t, s − t ∈ Λ⊥4 (A) and Gs ≡ b (mod 4),
Gt ≡ b (mod 4).
Let
¯
x1, ¯
x2{0, 1}n and
¯
y
1
,
¯
y
2
{0, 1}n be the n input and n output coordinates of s and t re-
spectively, i.e.
¯
x1 = (s2d+1, . . . , s2d+n),
¯
y
1
= (sk1 , . . . , skn) and ¯
x2 = (t2d+1, . . . , t2d+n),
¯
y
2
= (tk1 , . . . , tkn). Let also ¯
w1 ∈ {0, 1}n and ¯w2 ∈ {0, 1}
n be the n last coordinates of
s and t respectively. Then, similarly to the previous case, A(s− t) = 0 (mod 4) implies
¯
y
1
=
¯
y
2
and
¯
w1 = ¯
w2. From ¯
w1 = ¯
w2, s ̸= t and the uniqueness guaranteed by Proposition
4.2 we can easily conclude that
¯
x1 ̸= ¯x2. Also, using Claim 4.10 we get that 𝒞(¯x1) = ¯
y
1
,
𝒞(
¯
x2) =
¯
y
2
and since
¯
y
1
=
¯
y
2
we get 𝒞(
¯
x1) = 𝒞(¯x2) with ¯x1 ̸= ¯x2. Therefore, the pair ¯x1, ¯x2is a valid solution to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT with input 𝒞.
This completes the hardness proof for q = 4.
5This is ice versa in the case of ⊕ gate, but we can assume without loos of generality that our circuit consists of
only ∧¯ gates and then this holds.
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For the q = 2` case, we need to augment A and G. This is done by introducing ` variables for
every node of 𝒞. One of the is still the value variable and the `− 1 rest are auxiliary variables.
We also have to concatenate a zero matrix of size s× (`− 1)(n + s) on the right of G. For the
matrix A ∈ Zn×`(n+s), we concatanate ` − 1 matrices of the form 2iI for i ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . . , `} on
the right. The vector b remains the same. The new tuple is still a valid input for cSIS, since the
parameters are appropriately set and G remains binary invertible. Since only zero entries on the
right have been added to the matrix G, it decribes the circuit 𝒞 as we argued above. Finally, let
x ∈ {0, 1}`(n+s) such that Ax = 0 (mod 4), then the last (`− 1)n coordinates of x must be 0 and
the rest of the proof is as above.
Combining Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, we prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4.11. The cSIS problem is PPP-complete.
We provide an example of our reduction for very simple circuit 𝒞 in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A simple example of the construction of Lemma 4.5.
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5 Complete Collision Resistant Hash Function
The similarities between the cSIS problem and SIS raise the question of whether cSIS has cryp-
tographic applications. In this section, we propose a candidate family of collision-resistant hash
(CRH) functions based on the average-case hardness of the cSIS problem, and also discuss its worst-
case hardness. The computational problem weak-cSIS associated with our collision resistant hash
function family is a variant of cSIS presented in Section 4. In this case, the modular constraint are
homogeneous, i.e. b = 0, and the inequality constraints on the dimension of the matrices are strict.
This change in the relation of the parameters might seem insignificant, but it is actually very
important since it transforms or problem into a purely lattice problem: On input matrices A, G
with corresponding bases BA and BG, where G is binary invertible, find two vectors x and y such
that x, y ∈ ℒ(BG) and x− y ∈ ℒ(BA). Our proof that weak-cSIS is PWPP-complete, increases
our hope that SIS is PWPP-complete too, since it overcomes one important difficulty towards
reducing weak-cSIS to SIS. We start with a formal definition of collision-resistant hash function.
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions: Let k be the security parameter. A family of functions
ℋ =
{
H
¯
s : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}p(k)
}
¯
s∈{0,1}p′(k)
where p(k) and p′(k) are polynomials, is collision-resistant if:
(Shrinking) The output of H
¯
s is smaller than its input. Namely, p(k) < k.
(Efficient Sampling) There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Gen that on
input 1k samples a uniform key
¯
s.
(Efficient Evaluation) There exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on
input a key
¯
s and an
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k outputs H
¯
s(¯
x) ∈ {0, 1}p(k).
(Collision-Resistance) For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary 𝒜, there exists
a negligible function ν(k) = negl(k), such that for any k ∈ Z+:
Pr
¯
s←Gen(1k)
[
(
¯
x1, ¯
x2)← 𝒜(1k, ¯s) s.t. ¯x1 ̸= ¯x2 and H¯s(¯x1) = H¯s(¯x2)
]
≤ ν(k).
Next, we define our new CRH function family. Let k be the security parameter. Let ` ∈ Z+,
q = 2` and d ∈ Z+ be parameters. Let r = poly(k) such that r` < k. The family of hash functions,
ℋcSIS =
{
H
¯
s : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}r`
}
¯
s∈{0,1}p(k)
is defined as follows.
- GencSIS(1k) samples a uniform ¯
s ∈ {0, 1}p(k) and interprets it as a uniform matrix A ∈
Z
r×(k+`d)
q and a uniformly chosen binary invertible matrix G ∈ Zd×(k+`d)q . This algorithm
runs in polynomial-time in k.
- H(A,G)(¯
x): On input
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k, compute the unique
¯
u ∈ {0, 1}`d such that
G
[
¯
u
¯
x
]
= 0 (mod q) as in Proposition 4.2, and output bd
(
A
[
¯
u
¯
x
]
(mod q)
)
.
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Remark 5.1. We note that if SIS 6 is hard, then ℋcSIS is collision-resistant. In fact, a more general
statement holds: if cSIS with b = 0 is hard on average, then ℋcSIS is collision-resistant. Also,
based on the above description of H(A,G), the vector ¯
z =
[
¯
u
¯
x
]
is a solution to cSIS with input
(A, G, 0). Finally, note that for ` = 1 finding collisions is trivial and hence we assume that ` ≥ 2.
In the rest of this section, we analyze the hardness of finding collision in the ℋcSIS family. We
call this problem weak-cSIS (weak-cSIS) because of its similar nature to cSIS. First, we consider its
worst-case hardness and draw connections between the family ℋcSIS, a restricted version of the
cSIS problem, and the complexity class PWPP. Then, we move on to the average-case hardness
of weak-cSIS and argue that it defines a canditate for a universal CRH function family.
5.1 Worst-case Hardness of ℋcSIS
The class Polynomial Weak Pigeon Principle PWPP (a subclass of PPP) is particularly interesting
for cryptography because it contains all collision-resistant hash functions. In this part, we show
that a generalized version of the SIS problem we define below, namely weak-cSIS, is complete for
the class PWPP.
weak-cSIS Problem.
Input: Any key
¯
s = (A, G) ∈ Zr×(`d+k)q ×Zd×(`d+k)q that indexes a function H
¯
s ∈ ℋcSIS.
Output: Two boolean vectors
¯
x1 ̸= ¯x2, such that H¯s(¯x1) = H¯s(¯x2).
The membership of weak-cSIS in PWPP is straight-forward. The challenging part of the proof
is in showing its PWPP-hardness, which shares some common ideas with the proof of Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 5.2. weak-cSIS is in PWPP.
Proof. We show a Karp-reduction from weak-cSIS to COLLISION. Let
¯
s be an input to weak-cSIS
and let 𝒞 be the poly(|
¯
s|) size circuit that on input
¯
x outputs H
¯
s(¯
x). Because r` < k, the 𝒞 is a
valid input for COLLISION. Let
¯
x1, ¯
x2 be the two boolean vectors that COLLISION outputs. Thus,
𝒞(
¯
x1) = 𝒞(¯x2), which directly implies that (¯x1, ¯x2) is a solution of weak-cSIS with input ¯s.
Now, we move to the more challenging hardness proof. Even though some of the proof
techniques are reminiscent of the ones in Section 4, we need new ideas, mainly because of the
homogeneity of the constraints in weak-cSIS. Before presenting the proof, we define a special
version of COLLISION problem. Then, we state and prove an easy lemma. This lemma has
appeared in various previous works (see Lemma 2.2 in [Jer16]), but it is useful for us to state and
prove it using our notation.
COLLISIONp(κ) Problem.
Input: A circuit 𝒞 with κ inputs and p(κ) outputs.
Output: Two boolean vectors
¯
x1 ̸= ¯x2, such that 𝒞(¯x1) = 𝒞(¯x2).
Then, the following lemma is easy to check:
Lemma 5.3. The COLLISION problem is Karp-reducible to COLLISIONκ−2.
6For a definition of SIS, see Section 5.2.
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Proof. First, we claim that it suffices to show that COLLISIONκ−1 is Karp-reducible to COLLISIONκ−2.
This is because every circuit 𝒞 with κ inputs and m outputs can be transformed into a circuit 𝒞 ′
with κ inputs and κ − 1 outputs by padding the output with zeros. We note that every collision
of 𝒞 ′ is a collision of 𝒞 .
Now, we show that COLLISIONκ−1 is Karp-reducible to COLLISIONκ−2. Let 𝒞 be a circuit with
n inputs and n− 1 outputs, we create a new circuit 𝒞 ′ with n + 1 inputs and n− 1 outputs such
that 𝒞 ′(
¯
x, b) = 𝒞(𝒞(
¯
x), b), where
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, COLLISIONκ−2 with input 𝒞 ′
outputs
¯
y
1
= (
¯
x1, b1) and
¯
y
2
= (
¯
x2, b2) such that
¯
y
1
̸=
¯
y
2
and 𝒞 ′(
¯
y
1
) = 𝒞 ′(
¯
y
2
). We consider the
following possible cases:
- b1 ̸= b2, then
¯
y
1
and
¯
y
2
form a collision for 𝒞.
- b1 = b2, then ¯
x1 ̸= ¯x2 and one of the following holds: 𝒞(¯x1) ̸= 𝒞(¯x2) or 𝒞(¯x1) = 𝒞(¯x2). Inthe first case,
¯
y
1
and
¯
y
2
form a collision for 𝒞. Otherwise,
¯
x1 and ¯
x2 form a collision for 𝒞.
The above lemma naturally generalizes to any polynomial shrinkage p(k) of the input by
repeating the same construction. For our purposes shrinking the input by two bits is enough.
Lemma 5.4. weak-cSIS is PWPP-hard.
Proof. From Lemma 5.3, it suffices to show a Karp-reduction from COLLISIONκ−2 to weak-cSIS.
Let 𝒞 be an input of COLLISIONκ−2 with n inputs, r = n− 2 outputs and d gates. Also, let q = 4.
We can generalize to any q = 2` for ` > 1 similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.5.
If we set
¯
u ∈ {0, 1}2d to be the unique binary vector such that G
[
¯
u
¯
x
]
= 2 · 1 (mod 4) in the
construction of H
¯
s(¯
x), then the proof follows exactly the same steps as the one of Lemma 4.5.
However, in this case we can prove a stronger statement, where
[
¯
u
¯
x
]
belongs to the lattice Λ⊥(G).
First, let us restate the part of the Claim 4.6 that we need for our proof.
Claim 5.5. The following equivalences hold:
∙ x⊕ y = z ⇐⇒ ∃w ∈ {0, 1} s.t. − x− y + w + 2z ≡ 0 (mod 4)
∙ x ∨ y = z ⇐⇒ ∃w ∈ {0, 1} s.t. x + y + w + 2z ≡ 0 (mod 4)
If we could implement a circuit using {⊕,∨}, then combining Claim 5.5 and the proof tech-
niques of Lemma 4.5, we would have the desired result. Even though this is not possible, we
note that we can implement a circuit using {⊕,∨, 1}, since the implementation of ∨¯ suffices and
(x ∨ y)⊕ 1 = x ∨¯ y. Inspired by the above observations, our approach in showing the hardness
of weak-cSIS is to construct a valid input
¯
s = (A, G) for weak-cSIS such that G encodes a circuit
consisting of only XOR and OR gates and every solution of this instance of weak-cSIS gives a
solution for COLLISIONκ−2 with input 𝒞.
First, we observe that the fact that r = n− 2 guarantees the existence of at least 6⌊k/4⌋ pairs
of
¯
x1 and ¯
x2 such that ¯
x1 ̸= ¯x2 and H¯s(¯x1) = H¯s(¯x2). In particular, there exist collision pairs suchthat
¯
x1 ̸= ¯0 and ¯x2 ̸= ¯0.As we explained, without loss of generality, we assume that 𝒞 consists of only {∨,⊕, 1} gates.
Before starting with the reduction we change our circuit 𝒞 to a circuit 𝒞 ′ such that any collision
of 𝒞 ′ corresponds to a collision of 𝒞. We construct a circuit 𝒞 ′ such that it first computes the OR
of all the inputs, z = x1 ∨ x2 ∨ · · · ∨ xn. Then, in the circuit’s graph we substitute the outgoing
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edges of nodes with label “1” with outgoing edges from the node z, that we introduced. Hence,
𝒞’ only contains {∨,⊕} gates. The next claim follows by construction of 𝒞 ′.
Claim 5.6. For every
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k ∖
¯
0, it holds that 𝒞 ′(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
x) and 𝒞 ′(
¯
0) =
¯
0.
Proof. Let
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}k ∖
¯
0, then for this input the value of the node z that we introduced is certainly
equal to 1. Since we replaced all the uses of the constant gate 1 with the output of z and z outputs
one, the results of the circuit will be exactly the same. Also, it is easy to observe that any circuit
with only {∨,⊕} gates, on input
¯
0 outputs always
¯
0, and hence 𝒞 ′(0) =
¯
0.
Let G ∈ Zd×2(n+r)q be the binary invertible matrix that encodes 𝒞 ′ (as described in Lemma 4.5)
and A ∈ Zr×2(n+r)q be as in Lemma 4.5. Observe that since we have only used the gates {∨,⊕}
in 𝒞 ′ the vector b in the reduction described in Lemma 4.5 is always equal to 0. Thus, (A, G) is a
valid input for the problem weak-cSIS.
Let (
¯
x1, ¯
x2) be a solution of weak-cSIS with ¯
x1 ̸= ¯0 and ¯x2 ̸= ¯0, then the pair ¯x1 and ¯x2 is acollision for 𝒞. But, we cannot guarantee that
¯
x1 ̸= ¯0 and ¯x2 ̸= ¯0 when we use 𝒞
′ as input for
weak-cSIS. Thus, we need a modification of 𝒞 ′ that guarantees that weak-cSIS will not return the
¯
0-vector as part of a solution. To achieve this, we construct a new circuit 𝒞 ′′ that is exactly the
same as 𝒞 ′ with one more output variable set to be equal to z = x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . .∨ xn. This last output
of 𝒞 ′′ is equal to 1 if and only if
¯
x ̸=
¯
0. Observe that the output of 𝒞 ′′ consists of n− 1 bits, and
hence 𝒞 ′′ still compresses its domain by one bit. Let (A′, G′) be the matrices corresponding to
𝒞 ′′ according to the construction of proof of Lemma 4.5, then
¯
s′ = (A′, G′) is a valid input for
weak-cSIS.
We conclude the proof by observing that every output of weak-cSIS with input
¯
s′ gives a
collision 𝒞 ′′(
¯
x) = 𝒞 ′′(
¯
y), with
¯
x ̸=
¯
y. If
¯
x ̸=
¯
0 and
¯
y ̸=
¯
0, then it follows from Claim 5.6 and the
construction of 𝒞 ′′ that 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y), and hence the pair
¯
x,
¯
y is a solution to our initial COLLISION
instance. Additionally, there is no collision of the form
¯
0 and
¯
x. Assume that there was, then
since the last bit of 𝒞 ′′(
¯
0) is 0, it must be that 𝒞 ′′(
¯
x) is also 0. However, by construction of 𝒞 ′′,
¯
0 is
the unique binary vector for which the last bit of the output is 0, so it must be that
¯
x = 0 which
is a contradiction. Therefore,
¯
x ̸=
¯
0 and
¯
y ̸=
¯
0, and the lemma follows.
By combining Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.4, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 5.7. The weak-cSIS problem is PWPP-complete.
5.2 Average-case Hardness of ℋcSIS
In the previous section, we showed that weak-cSIS defines a worst-case collision resistant hash
function, similar to the result of [Sel92] for one-way functions. However, the definition of
collision-resistance in cryptography requires a stronger property. More specifically, it says that
given a random chosen function in the family, it is hard to find a collision for this function. In
this section, we investigate the average-case hardness of ℋcSIS in the search of a construction for
a candidate of a both natural and universal collision-resistant hash function.
We have briefly mentioned the connection between ℋcSIS and SIS. Now, we describe it in
more detail. We start by defining the SIS problem.
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SISq,n,m,β,p Problem.
Input: A uniformly random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , where m > 2n log(q).
Output: A vector r ∈ Zmq such that ‖r‖p ≤ β and Ar = 0 (mod q).
Whenever the parameters are clear from the context, we drop them from the subscripts for ease
of notation.
It is easy to see that if SIS is hard on the average, then ℋcSIS is collision-resistant. Let A ∈
Zn×mq be uniformly random and ¯
x1 and ¯
x2 be a collision of H(A,0). Then, ¯
x1 − ¯x2 is a solution
of SIS with input A. This remark, combined with the known reduction from O˜(n)-SIVP to
SISO˜(n),n,Ω(n polylog(n)),
√
n,2 [MR07], directly implies a reduction from O˜(n)-SIVP to weak-cSIS.
Corollary 5.8. O˜(n)-SIVP is reducible to weak-cSIS, and thus is contained in PWPP.
Finally we note that, since weak-cSIS is PWPP-complete and PWPP contains all collision-
resistant hash functions, the following statement is also true.
Corollary 5.9. If there exists a family of collision-resistant hash functions ℋ, then there exists a dis-
tribution over keys
¯
s ∈ {0, 1}p(k) for ℋcSIS, where Gen draws key from this distribution and ℋcSIS is
collision-resistant.
6 Lattice Problems and PPP
The lattice nature of the cSIS problem raises also the next question:
What is the connection between the class PPP and lattices?
In this section we present the known result for the lattice problems that are contained in PPP
and we also mention how some of these results are implied by the completeness results that we
presented in the previous sections. We start with the formal definition of the lattice problems
that we are interested in.
Lattice Problems. We recall some of the most important lattice problems: the Shortest Vector
Problem (γ-SVP), the Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (γ-SIVP) and the Closest Vector
Problem (γ-CVP). We start by defining some important lattice quantities. For a lattice ℒ,
dist(t,ℒ) = min
x∈ℒ
‖x− t‖ (6.1)
λi(ℒ(B)) = min
x∈ℒ∖span(v1,...,vi−1),x ̸=0
‖x‖, for i = 1, . . . , n (6.2)
where ‖vi‖ = λi(ℒ(B)).
γ-SVP Problem.
Input: A n-dimensional basis B ∈ Zn×n.
Output: A lattice vector v ∈ ℒ such that ‖v‖ ≤ γ(n) · λ1(ℒ(B)).
γ-SIVP Problem.
Input: A n-dimensional basis B ∈ Zn×n.
Output: A set of n linearly independent lattice vectors v1, . . . , vn such that maxi‖vi‖ ≤ γ(n) ·
λn(ℒ(B)).
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γ-CVP Problem.
Input: A n-dimensional basis B ∈ Zn×n and a target vector t ∈ Qn.
Output: A lattice vector v such that ‖v− t‖ ≤ γ(n) · dist(v,ℒ(B)).
1
γ -BDD Problem.
Input: A n-dimensional basis B ∈ Zn×n and a target vector t ∈ Qn, with t ≤ λ1(ℒ)2γ(n) .
Output: A lattice vector v such that ‖v− t‖ = dist(t,ℒ(B)).
Where γ(n) ≥ 1 is a non-decreasing function in the lattice dimension n. For γ = 1 we get the
exact version of the problem.
We now show that well-studied (approximation) lattice problems are contained in PPP. First,
we define the MINKOWSKI problem and show a reduction to BLICHFELDT. Second, using known
reductions, we conclude the membership of other lattice problems to PPP.
MINKOWSKIp Problem.
Input: A n-dimensional basis B ∈ Zn×n for a lattice ℒ = ℒ(B).
Output: A vector x ∈ ℒ such that ‖x‖p ≤ n1/p det(ℒ)1/n.
The authors in [BJP+15] give a reduction from MINKOWSKI to PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT. We
follow a different approach by showing a reduction from MINKOWSKIp to BLICHFELDT. We
emphasize that, even though a proof of Minkowski’s theorem uses Blichfedlt’s theorem, our
reduction differs from this proof technique. We restrict to subsets of integer points, and thus
the inherently continuous techniques used in the original proof of Minkowski’s theorem via
Blichfeldt’s theorem cannot be applied in our case.
Lemma 6.1. For p ≥ 1 and p = ∞, MINKOWSKIp is in PPP.
Proof. For any p ≥ 1 it holds that ‖x‖∞ ≤ n1/p‖x‖p. This implies a Karp-reduction from
MINKOWSKIp to MINKOWSKI∞. Hence, it suffices to show a Karp-reduction from MINKOWSKI∞
to BLICHFELDT.
Let B ∈ Zn×n be an input to MINKOWSKIp, i.e. a basis for ℒ = ℒ(B). Let ` = ⌊det(ℒ)1/n⌋,
S = ([0, `]n ∩Zn) ∖ {0} and s = |S| = (`+ 1)n − 1. Define the value function representation for
S to be (s,𝒱S(x)) = (s,𝒱[0,`]n(x + 1)), where the circuit 𝒱[0,`]n is constructed as in Lemma 2.1.
To show that B and S are a valid input for BLICHFELDT, we need to show |S| ≥ det(ℒ) ⇒
(⌊det(ℒ)1/n⌋+ 1)n ≥ det(ℒ)1/n + 1. This follows from the next claim for x = det(ℒ).
Claim 6.2. For any x ∈ Z and n ≥ 1, (⌊x1/n⌋+ 1)n ≥ x + 1.
Proof. If x = kn for some k ∈ Z, then ⌊x1/n⌋ = k. Hence, (k + 1)n ≥ kn + 1 ⇒ (⌊x1/n⌋+ 1)n ≥
x + 1. Otherwise, let k ∈ Z be the smallest integer such that x < kn. Then, ⌊x1/n⌋ = k− 1 and
x + 1 ≤ kn. Hence, (⌊x1/n⌋+ 1)n = kn ≥ x + 1.
Finally, BLICHFELDT on input B and S will output one of following:
1. a vector x such that x ∈ S∩ℒ. Since x ∈ S, we get ‖x‖∞ ≤ det(ℒ)1/n. Hence, x is a solution
to MINKOWSKI∞.
2. two vectors x ̸= y, such that x, y ∈ S and x− y ∈ ℒ. Since x, y ∈ S, we get x− y ∈ [−`, `]n.
Hence, ‖x− y‖∞ ≤ det(ℒ)1/n and x− y is a solution to MINKOWSKI∞.
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A direct corollary of the above lemma is that the most common version of the MINKOWSKI
problem in the `2-norm, is in PPP.
Corollary 6.3. MINKOWSKI2 is in PPP.
Furthermore, there are known connections between γ-SVP with polynomial approximation
factor and the class PPP. Specifically, it is known that n-SVP is Cook-reducible to MINKOWSKI∞
(see [Rot16, Theorem 1.23]).
This, along with the reduction from γ-SVP to
√
nγ2-CVP in [SD15] (for γ = n) and Lemma 6.1,
implies the following.
Corollary 6.4. n-SVP and n2.5-CVP are Cook-reducible to BLICHFELDT.
A special type of lattices, that have gained a lot of attention due to their efficiency in cryp-
tographic applications, are ideal lattices. The definition and cryptographic applications of ideal
lattices are outside the scope of this work and can be found in [LPR13]. But, we include the
following lemma, which needs only the basic fact that λ1(ℒ) = λ2(ℒ) = · · · = λn(ℒ) in ideal
lattices, where λi is the length of the i-th linearly independent vector. Let us denote by γ-iSVP
the shortest vector problem on ideal lattices.
Lemma 6.5.
√
n-iSVP is in PPP.
Proof. For ideal lattices, it holds that λ1(ℒ) = λ2(ℒ) = · · · = λn(ℒ). Minkowski’s second
Theorem states that
λ1 · λ2 · · · · · λn ≥ det(ℒ).
Hence, on ideal lattices λ1 ≥ det(ℒ)1/n. Combining this with the first Minkowski’s theorem, that
states that λ1 ≤
√
n det(ℒ)1/n, we get that MINKOWSKI2 with input ℒ solves
√
n-SVP of ℒ.
7 Cryptographic Assumptions in PPP
The fact that the class PPP exhibits strong connections to cryptography was already known
since its introduction [Pap94]. Papadimitriou [Pap94] showed that if PPP = FP, then one-way
permutations do not exist. Since there are constructions of one-way permutations based on the
discrete logarithm problem onZ*p for a prime p, the problem of factoring Blum integers7 [Rab79],
the RSA assumption [RSA78] and a special type of elliptic curves [Kal91], all these cryptographic
assumptions become insecure if PPP = FP.
Moreover, if PWPP = FP, then collision-resistant hash functions do not exist; this follows
directly from the definition of the class PWPP. Collision-resistant hash function families can be
constructed based, for example, on the hardness assumption of the discrete logarithm problem
over Z*p for a prime p [CvP92], and from the SIS problem [MR07] problem, which implies that
these assumptions become insecure if PPP = FP or even if PWPP = FP.
Additionally, recently it was shown that integer factorization is in PPP [Jer16]. In fact,
Jerˇábek [Jer16] showed that integer factorization lies in PWPP ∩ PPA, which gives strong evi-
dence that factoring is not PPP-complete.
We extend the connections between cryptographic assumptions and PPP by presenting a
more general formulation of discrete logarithm and showing its membership to PPP. We call
this formulation discrete logarithm over general groups.
7A Blum integer is the product of two distinct primes p, q such that p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4).
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Definition 7.1. A general group (G, ?) is a cyclic group for which there exists a circuit describing
a bijection ℐG : G → [ord(G)], which we call the index function of G in analogy to the definition
of Section 2.2, and a circuit f : [ord(G)]× [ord(G)] → [ord(G)], which we call group operation
function, such that for all x, y ∈ G, ℐG(x ? y) = f (ℐG(x), ℐG(y)). The group (G, ?) is defined by
1. a number g in [ord(G)] such that ℐG(g) = g, where g is the generator of G,
2. a number id in [ord(G)] such that ℐG(id) = id, where id is the identity element of G,
3. the polynomial-size circuit for the group operation function f .
In order to illustrate the above definition we show that the multiplicative group Z*p for prime
p is a general group. First, note that ord(Z*p) = p− 1. Let c ∈ Z*p be a generator of Z*p, then
we set g = c− 1 ∈ [p− 1], id = 0 and we define f : [p− 1]× [p− 1] → [p− 1] as follows: let
x, y ∈ Z*p, then f (x, y) = (x + 1) · (y + 1)− 1 (mod q). Now, we are ready to define the discrete
logarithm problem over a general group.
DLOG Problem.
Input: An alleged general group (G, ?) represented by (g, id, fG, ℐG)a and a target y ∈ [s].
Output: One of the following:
1. an x ∈ [s] such that ℐG(gx) = y,
2. two x, y ∈ [s] such that x ̸= y and ℐG(gx) = ℐG(gy).
aObserve that in this definition g and id are just elements of G and fG, ℐG are given in the form of circuits.
Remark 7.2. We aim at defining only syntantic problems, so even though we could define the
promise version of the problem where (G, ?) is always a general group, we choose to define it as
above. In the first case, the output is the discrete logarithm of the target element, whereas in the
second case, the output is a proof that the tuple (g, id, fG) does not represent a general group.
Also, we observe that given an element x ∈ [ord(G)] and the representation (g, id, fG) of
a general group, there exists an efficient procedure for computing ℐG(gx). For instance, using
repeating squaring starting with fG(g, g).
Theorem 7.3. DLOG is in PPP.
Proof. Let (g, id, fG, y) be an input for DLOG and n = ⌈log(s)⌉, then we construct a circuit 𝒞 :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as follows: For a binary vector
¯
x ∈ {0, 1}n, 𝒞(
¯
x) = |ℐG(gbc(¯x)) − y|. As we
mentioned in the remark above, we can compute 𝒞(
¯
x) efficiently using only g, id and fG.
Then, the output of PIGEONHOLE CIRCUIT with input 𝒞 is one of the following:
1. a binary vector
¯
x such that 𝒞(
¯
x) =
¯
0.
In this case, x = bc(
¯
x) is the discrete logarithm of y. Namely, ℐG(gx) = y.
2. two binary vectors
¯
x,
¯
y such that
¯
x ̸=
¯
y and 𝒞(
¯
x) = 𝒞(
¯
y).
In this case, ℐG(gbc(¯x)) = ℐG(gbc(¯y)) implies one of the following: (a) fG does not implement
a valid group operation over G, (b) ℐG is not a valid index circuit of the set G, or (c)
gbc(¯x) = g
bc(
¯
y). In either case this is a certificate that the input (g, id, fG, ℐG) does not
represent a valid general group.
Open Problem 7.4. Is DLOG PPP-hard?
We note that it is not known if elliptic curves are general groups, and hence discrete logarithm
over general elliptic curves is not known to belong in PPP (see Open Problem 1.5).
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Claim 4.6
Proof of Claim 4.6. The proof of this claim follows easily from the next Table 5, from which we
conclude various relationships between boolean functions with two inputs and modular equa-
tions (mod 4).
x y z w w+ 2z− x− y z+ 2w− x− y w+ 2z+ x+ y
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2 1
0 0 1 0 2 1 2
0 0 1 1 −1 −1 −1
0 1 0 0 −1 −1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 2
0 1 1 0 1 0 −1
0 1 1 1 2 2 0
1 0 0 0 −1 −1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 2
1 0 1 0 1 0 −1
1 0 1 1 2 2 0
1 1 0 0 2 2 2
1 1 0 1 −1 0 −1
1 1 1 0 0 −1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5: The values of specific modular expressions (mod 4) for all different binary values of
the variables.
B Parameters of cSIS and weak-cSIS
We give a summary of the notation that we use for the parameters of cSIS and weak-cSIS (or
ℋcSIS).
Notation Parameter Problem
n circuit input size both
k ℋcSIS input size weak-cSIS
d rows of G / gates of 𝒞 both
m columns of A and G both
r` output of ℋcSIS weak-cSIS
Also, the known relations between these quantities for a valid cSIS or weak-cSIS input are:
k = ` · n, m ≥ d`+ k = d`+ n`, k > r`.
40
C Universal Collision Resistant Hash Function Family
We sketch the construction of a universal (average-case hard) hash function, following Levin’s
paradigm [Lev87] for a universal one-way function. Let h be a hash function family that takes
two inputs a key k and a vector x ∈ {0, 1}n, and compresses the input x by one bit, i.e. h(k, x) ∈
{0, 1}n−1. Let p(·) be a polynomial that bounds the running time of h(k, ·). First, using padding
on the input we argue the existence of a hash function family h′ that is defined as
h′(k, x ∘ y) = h(k, x) ∘ y
such that |x ∘ y| = p(|x|). This implies that h′(k, ·) runs in quadratic time in |x ∘ y| (see [Gol06,
§2.4.1]). Second, using standard domain extension we argue the existence of a hash function fam-
ily h′′ that compresses the input for more than one bits, i.e. h′′ : {0, 1}n′ → {0, 1}n−1 (we exclude
the key k from the description of the domain). Specifically, we require that the compressing ratio
is enough so that the concatenation of m copies of h′′(k, ·) is smaller than the input, meaning that
n′ > m · (p(n)− 1). Let p′′(·) be a polynomial that bounds the running time of h′′. The hash
function h′(k, ·) runs in time quadratic to its input, and using this fact, p′′(·) can be made explicit
depending on the length of the extended domain that we require from h′′, once that length is
explicitly specified. This is enough to get an upper bound for the running time of h′′(k, ·).
The universal hash function is described by a collection of 2 ·m + 1 strings:
huni = (i1, . . . , im, k1, . . . , km, x).
The numbers i1, . . . , im (represented as strings) are the indices to Turing Machines (assume
a canonical ordering of TMs) that describe m different hash function families h′′ij : {0, 1}
n′ →
{0, 1}n−1, j = 1, . . . , m. The keys k j define the hash functions h′′ij(k j, ·). Finally, for j = 1, . . . , m,
we run each h′′ij(k j, x) for at most p
′′(|x|) steps and output:
huni(x) = h′′i1(k1, x) ∘ · · · ∘ h′′im(km, x).
If h′′ij(k j, x) does not terminate after p
′′(|x|), we output ⊥ for that j. We can see that if at least
one hash function family h′′ij is collision-resistant, then so is huni. At a high level, if at least one
hash function family hij is collision-resistant then so is h
′
ij
, and moreover so is h′′ij by the security of
domain extension (e.g. Merkle–Damgård). Without loss of generality we assume that all families
h′′ij are defined on the same domain and range. Finally, the simple hash function combiner in
which we concatenate the output of m different hash functions h′′ij(k j, ·), is collision-resistant as
long as at least one hash function family h′′ij is collision-resistant.
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